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ABSTRACT 
Democracy development techniques such as international election monitoring 
have increasingly become commonplace. Monitors are sent to far off locations to 
scrutinize the electoral processes and determine whether or not they have met the free and 
fair standards as established by their mandates. The term free and fair however, has 
become a catchphrase amongst many of those involved in the election monitoring and 
democracy development fields. The phrase is often interpreted loosely and is rarely 
clearly defined. Despite the recognition of the terms often differing interpretations, it 
remains a commonly used standard. The 2005 Ethiopian Elections demonstrate that free 
and fair, when interpreted differently by international electoral observers, can have 
consequential results.  
The thesis provides a political analysis of the Carter Centers and European 
Unions international election monitoring final reports of the 2005 Ethiopian elections. 
Following the 2005 Ethiopian elections the Carter Centers and the European Unions 
electoral observation reports became highly politicized. In the post election period, the 
two organizations came to different conclusions in regards to the validity of the electoral 
process. At the core of these differences were the organizations differing conceptions of 
what constitutes free and fair electoral practices. In the post election period the European 
Unions and Carter Centers reports have been pitted against one and other as those 
concerned with the election results seek to make sense of the reports.   
  This thesis is significant because it asks relevant questions about the 
consequences of differing understandings of free and fair. The thesis seeks to provide 
 iii
insight into international election monitoring and provide recommendations to improve 
the process.  
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Introduction 
Election observation has become a common trend among development agencies and 
donor countries. These groups send contingents of individuals to monitor elections in the 
developing world to ensure that the electoral process has proceeded according to a 
standard of free and fair.1 Development literature suggests that genuinely competitive 
elections are the most significant dimensions of a liberal democracy.2 Essentially, the 
purpose of election observation is to ensure that an election has been conducted in a free 
and fair manner, that political legitimization has been established and that democratic 
consolidation has made necessary progress. It is on this note that the election observation 
mission has become the quintessential legitimizing tool for development aid. Aid donors 
have come to insist that a country adopt Western political standards of democracy and 
good governance in order to receive political and social development aid. The devil 
however, has been in the details.  
Often, election monitors evaluate an election, declaring it free and fair while other 
observers will claim that there were too many electoral discrepancies for the election to 
be considered valid. This was the case in May 2005. The Ethiopian government invited 
international election observers to monitor the electoral process and assess the democratic 
nature of the election. Both the Carter Center and European Union (EU) responded to the 
invitation and sent observers to the nation. Both organizations set up an office in Addis 
                                                
1 The concept of free and fair must be defined for the purpose of this paper. By free and fair, I am referring 
to electoral practices that meet the most basic requirements of a national electoral code. More specifically, I 
am referring to electoral practices that work to increase democratic indicators as well as assist in the 
general capacity building of a nations political system.  These practices include but are not limited to: an 
independent and non-partisan electoral commission, equal access to government owned/operated resources 
for incumbent and opposition, accessibility of electoral polls to voters, freedom granted to opposition to 
campaign, universal voter registration, and strict regulations and consequences for vote rigging and 
gerrymandering.  
2 This thesis is not examining African concept of Democracy. Instead, this work is looking at Western 
democratic concepts and how they apply to international democracy development initiatives.  
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Ababa prior to the elections. Both groups also engaged in pre-election monitoring 
activity. Although the EUs group was larger in number (160 observers) than the Carter 
Centers group (50 observers), the organizations both maintained a strong presence in the 
nation. The EU had access to more resources and was able to visit more polling stations. 
The Carter Center concentrated its efforts in the urban centers of Ethiopia. Following the 
closure of the polls, the Carter Center and EU produced their final electoral observation 
reports. To the disbelief of many, the organizations came to very different conclusions.   
Purpose of this Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the flexible definition of free and fair 
electoral practices by two observer missions- the Carter Center and EU. In the case of the 
Ethiopian May 2005 election, the EU and the Carter Center came to different conclusions 
in regards to the validity of the electoral process. The Carter Center noted some minor 
discrepancies in the electoral process but declared the election to be the most democratic 
Ethiopia has ever held. The EU recorded significantly more electoral problems and 
concluded that the elections were far from meeting international free and fair standards. 
The difference between the Carter Centers and EUs reports point to the organizations 
differing mandates and methods of assessment. The Carter Center compared the 2005 
election to past Ethiopian national electoral contests and produced a relatively favorable 
assessment of the elections. The EU held the election to international principles and 
values and produced a document that established that more democracy development work 
would be needed within the nation. These differing conclusions have contributed to the 
post election political and social chaos. Opposition parties and their supports have looked 
to the Carter Report as inaccurate while rallying behind the conclusions of the EU. The 
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ruling party and its supporters have embraced the Carter Report and have turned to the 
document to legitimize the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
regime. This thesis examines the politicization of electoral observation reports in light of 
the malleable and somewhat subjective standards for free and fair electoral practices in 
the electoral monitoring field.  
Importance of the Thesis 
 This thesis will contribute to the literature on electoral observation because it 
explores the serious nature of election monitoring in nations struggling for democracy. 
This thesis will show that there can be grave political and social implications when 
election monitoring and observing is conducted according to different mandates and 
different understandings of key democracy-development principles. As will be discussed 
in chapter 3, organizations develop their own definitions and understandings of important 
democracy development principles. For instance, elections are assessed on whether or not 
they were conducted in a free and fair manner. Because there is no over-arching 
international standard as to what constitutes a free and fair election, organizations are 
able to use their own understandings of free and fair to assess an election.  Problems arise 
however, when organizations understandings of free and fair differ greatly. The thesis 
suggests that electoral observation cannot be understood in isolation from broader 
international factors. In Ethiopia, the Carter Center and EU were operating under 
different understandings of free and fair. The result was the release of very different 
conclusions about the 2005 elections. This thesis will point to the politicization of the 
differing reports issued by the two organizations and evaluate the need for clear 
international standards and cooperation in the democracy development field.  
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Methodology: 
This thesis was written using three types of sources. Firstly, a discussion of 
development policy was found to be necessary. There is a seemingly endless supply of 
development and good governance literature. For the purpose of this thesis, I will limit 
my use of this material to concentrate primarily on democracy promotion and the 
importance of free and fair elections. Secondly, current literature on election monitoring 
and observing will be referenced to provide an understanding of the processes and 
criticisms associated with these democracy development initiatives. Thomas Carothers, 
Ron Gould and Amanda Sives have written a number of pieces on the processes and 
problems associated with election monitoring. Lastly, information on the May 2005 
Ethiopian elections will be used to gain an understanding of the situations surrounding 
the election monitoring process. Information from journal articles and newspapers will be 
the primary sources used to develop this section of the thesis.  
Chapter Outline 
These three themes have been broken down into four chapters and a conclusion. 
The thesis begins with a chapter that outlines the theories surrounding election 
monitoring and its benefits in terms of democracy development and promotion.  
Chapter 2: Democracy Promotion and the Rise of Election Monitoring 
Chapter two looks specifically at democracy development and good governance 
literature. The purpose of this chapter is to establish how upholding free and fair 
elections often constitutes the most important component of good governance policy. 
Those involved in democracy promotion often look to elections as key indicators of 
democratic development. This chapter seeks to explain that there is more to democratic 
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development than simply holding free and fair electoral contests. Also, found in this 
chapter is a description and explanation of the phrase free and fair. As election 
monitoring purpose is to establish whether an election was free and fair, this is an 
important concept to understand.  
Chapter 3: The Practice of Election Monitoring 
Chapter three seeks to explain electoral observation as a commonly used 
democracy development initiative. This chapter explains different types of election 
monitoring and discusses the common criticisms and problems associated with the 
practice of electoral observation. This chapter will give clarity to the terms utilized by 
election observers and monitors. This chapter will also introduce the key players involved 
in the electoral observation of the 2005 Ethiopian Elections as the Carter Centers and 
EUs election observation programs are discussed. The Chapter concludes with an 
explanation of the common criticism made of electoral observation.   
Chapter 4: The Case of the 2005 Ethiopian Elections 
The 2005 May elections in Ethiopia provide a provocative look into the 
international electoral monitoring process. These elections marked the first time the 
Ethiopian government had made a commitment to transparency in the electoral process 
by inviting international monitors. This chapter describes political climate within 
Ethiopia prior to and during the election. This chapter also outlines the EUs and the 
Carter Centers involvement in Ethiopian and seeks to introduce the differences in these 
organizations electoral monitoring approaches.   
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Chapter 5: The Politicization of the Election Observation Reports 
Chapter five seeks to flush out the implications of the EUs and Carter Centers 
reports. In the post-election period, the most interesting aspect of the political and social 
fallout has been the politicization of the electoral observation reports. The Carter Centers 
report in particular garnered a great deal of domestic and international attention and has 
received a great deal of criticism. This chapter is important to this thesis because it details 
the problems that arise when election monitoring is inconsistent and the standards of free 
and fair are not clearly defined.     
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by highlighting the key findings of this report. The 
Ethiopian Elections provide a provocative look into the practice of election monitoring. 
Looking at the post election chaos that has since consumed Ethiopia, it is clear that there 
exist a number of flaws in current international election monitoring initiatives. This 
chapter seeks to make a number of recommendations that would contribute to greater 
democratic development and productivity of election monitoring initiatives.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Democracy Promotion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
Introduction 
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank now argue that it is 
only with good governance that the developing world will achieve economic growth, 
poverty reduction, sustainable development, and social justice.3 While the world has 
come to embrace these goals, a number of factors have prevented the development of a 
formula capable of immediately actualizing them. The general elusiveness of good 
governance has allowed for a countless number of development initiatives to emerge, all 
of which have hoped to foster the necessary social, political and economic conditions that 
would bring to fruition these development goals. While a number of initiatives have 
come, gone and failed, democracy promotion has remained the cornerstone in the 
plethora of development variables. And it is within this category that election observation 
has surfaced and become one tool available to those involved in the international business 
of democracy promotion and development. As Thomas Carothers notes, Election 
observation is the best-established, most visible and often best funded type of democracy-
related assistance.4   
 Election observation and monitoring are not new phenomena. Many have pointed 
to the international expansion of democracy or the Third Wave of democratic transition 
as the force that brought monitoring to the foreground. The number of democratically 
governed nations began to increase in the 1970s only to swell in the 1990s with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. This dramatic and rapid expansion of democratic 
governments led to an overwhelming prominence being placed on elections. 
                                                
3 Jon Abbink, Rethinking Democratization and Election Observation. In Election observation and 
Democracy in Africa, edited by Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling (New York, St. Martins Press, 2000) 1. 
4 Thomas Carothers. The Observers Observed. Journal of Democracy Vol. 8 No. 3 July 1997. 18 
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 Elections have been looked upon as more than simply reflecting the will of the 
people in their choice of government. In newly formed democracies and in nations with 
turbulent democratic records, free and fair elections are promoted as a legitimatizing 
feature and the international donor community has come to assume that elections can 
encourage further democratization.5 In conflict ridden nations, elections are believed to 
be capable of resolving long-standing quarrels.6 Elections have become one of the 
defining institutions of modern democracy. Free and fair elections have become an 
increasingly critical requirement for governments to gain international legitimacy. 
 The following is a discussion of good governance and democracy development 
theory. Beginning with a discussion of democracy and the differences between the 
processes of democratization,7 this chapter will outline and detail concepts that are 
essential to the understanding of the process of election monitoring. As election 
monitoring is a product of democracy development and good governance discourse, it is 
important to see how the dialogue between good governance theorists and democracy 
promotion analysts has evolved and developed into a tool that the international 
community has come to perceive as vital. Election monitoring roots are deep although the 
process is a relatively recent initiative.   
Democracy Defined  
Election monitoring is viewed as a process that can enhance the quality of 
democracy within a nation. Ensuring the validity of an election is of particular 
                                                
5 Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, (Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 2003), 222.  
6 This is often argued in the case of Mozambique. It is said that the 1994 election brought to an end a long 
civil war that had ravaged the country since its independence.  
7 Democratization is often referred to as the adoption of democratic governing principles and the ensuing 
process of democratic consolidation. 
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importance because a genuine democratic election is viewed as a true articulation of 
sovereignty. In theory, an election belongs to the people of a country and represents the 
free expression of whose will provides the basis for authority and legitimacy of 
government.8  
Democracy is built on a foundation of rights and virtues. Democratically 
governed nations should value and respect the rights of individuals to act according to 
their own belief systems; to challenge political authority; and to have access to equality, 
liberty, justice and suffrage.9 Democratic virtues include the ability to compromise, 
participate fairly, and act according to tolerance.10 Democracy theorists have come to 
understand that these rights and virtues permeate democratic governance. Some theorists 
however, have placed greater emphasis on one of these features over all others.  
Robert Dahl suggests that the key characteristic of democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens.11 In a later work 
entitled On Democracy, Dahl offers a definition of democracy that looks specifically at 
the electoral contest and he provides a five pronged model. Democracy, he suggests, 
presents opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened 
understanding, exercising final control over the agenda and inclusion of adults.12 Dahls 
conception is based on an understanding that the key characteristic of a democracy is the 
electoral contest.  
                                                
8 Carter Center, Declaration of Principles for international Election Observation and Code of Conduct for 
International Election Observers, Commemorated at the United Nations, New York on 27 October 2005. 
Retrieved on line at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2231.pdf on 27 February 2006.  
9 Steven Hood, Political Development and Democratic Theory: Rethinking Comparative Politics, (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2004), 21.   
10 Hood, 23-24. 
11 Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 1.  
12 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 38. 
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Elections are at the forefront of democracy development rhetoric. As Dahls 
definition implies, a successful democracy consists of electoral contests that represent the 
will of the citizens. While Dahls definition of democracy is easily understood and widely 
accepted, it leaves out the fine details. A democracy consists of more than well conducted 
elections. A functioning democracy involves an entrenched and adhered to constitution, 
strong democratic institutions,13 an accountable public administrative apparatus, the rule 
of law, mechanisms capable of checking the power of political officials and the 
willingness of the political elite to adhere to democratic values and principles. It should 
be recognized that a democracy involves more than simply holding clean elections.  
Good Governance 
Democracy promotion literature premises many of its goals on the importance of 
establishing good governance. Many have interpreted the concept of good governance to 
represent and be indicative of democratic processes. People have come to understand 
good governance in terms of a nations ability to adhere to and practice democratic 
principles and values. Recently however, good governance has been interpreted in a more 
encompassing manner. Good governance is the term given to political processes that are 
conducted in a manner that ensures accountability, transparency, governmental 
responsiveness, and legitimacy. Such an understanding of good governance focuses on 
quality management and administration. Essentially, good governance is the effective and 
responsible administration of a given territory.14 
                                                
13 These institutions include at the very least a legislature, a judiciary, and an administrative apparatus. 
14 Francis Deng and Terrence Lyons, Promoting Responsible Sovereignty in Africa, in Africa Reckoning: 
A Quest for Good Governance edited by Francis Deng and Terrence Lyons, (Washington: Brookings 
University Press, 1998), 1. 
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The World Bank however, has identified good governance as the ability of a 
government to provide good policy. According to the World Bank, good governance is 
the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a countrys economic and 
social resources for development.15 The World Bank has interpreted good governance to 
mean efficiency in the public service, an effective judiciary sector, respect for human 
rights and a pluralistic institutional structure.16  
 The UN has used good governance as an organizing concept for its involvement 
and intervention in a number of fields.17 The United Nations defines good governance 
according to an eight point model. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the 
rule of law. According to this model, the UN assures that corruption is minimized, the 
views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in 
society are heard in decision-making.18 The UN has interpreted good governance in a 
manner that allows the concept to be viewed synonymously with democracy but can 
include other forms of government. 
 Good governance has been interpreted in a number of ways by international 
organizations and academics. However, what is important to know is that good 
governance has four main components. First, good governance rests on the foundation of 
constitutionalism. A strong, entrenched constitution and the rule of law are at the heart of 
good governance. The second component is good management and sound administrative 
                                                
15 World Bank, Governance and Development, (Washington: World Bank, 1992) 3. 
16 Laura Zanotti, Governmentalizing the Post Cold-War International Regime: The UN Debate on 
Democratization and Good Governance in Alternatives 30 (2005), 468. 
17 Zanotti, 469. 
18 United Nations, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Human 
Settlements, What is Good Governance? retrieved on line at http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/ 
governance.htm on 2 April 2006. 
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practices. Good governance rests on efficient and effective public management, the 
absence of corruption and overtly partisan bureaucratic behavior. The third component is 
the formation and implementation of policies that reflect the will of the populous. Lastly, 
good governance is based on a governing structure that reflects the popular will. 
Elections are viewed as the most common element to ensure that the government is 
representative and accountable. Good governance is reflective of democracy. 
Democratization versus Democracy Promotion 
 Democracy development assistance programs usually take one of two forms, civil 
or governmental. Democracy promoters target civil society because it is believed that 
with education and support, people will prefer democracy. On the other hand, 
governments are targeted and requested to make commitments to democratic tenets under 
the assumption that institutional reform and good faith in the governing body will lead to 
transition.19 It is the latter form of democracy development assistance that gains the most 
attention in international relations. It is also within this category that election monitoring 
and assistance falls. 
One must be cautious when referring to democratic development assistance. 
While there are many names for this type of programming (democracy assistance and 
nation building) it is important not to confuse it with the process of democratization. 
Democratization is a political transition, moving away from an authoritarian form of 
governing toward democracy. Democracy development assistance refers to international 
and domestic efforts to encourage, support or influence democratic change and political 
                                                
19 Steven Shoofs and Jeroen de Zeeuw. The future of Democracy Assistance: Seminar Report. (Nairobi: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations,  April 2005) 5. Retrieved on line at 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050428_cru_proc_nairobi.pdf on 20 February 2006.  
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reform in countries.20 This distinction is important for several reasons. First, it is 
important to realize that democratic assistance programs may not result in significant or 
drastic democratic progress or change within a nation and the ultimate outcome is not 
always democratization. As argued by Marina Ottaway, the semi-authoritarian form of 
government is a common product of democracy development assistance. Second, if 
democracy development assistance contributes to increases in democratic indicators and 
the process of democratization, it is possible that without continued assistance a nation 
may revert back to old undemocratic ways. Third, if the organization or nation 
responsible for administering democracy assistance is motivated by institutional or 
strategic pressures, meaningful democracy promotion may become subverted by 
institutional requirements, and democratization may not ensue.21 Despite a number of 
positive examples in which assistance programs resulted in meaningful change, there are 
many examples in the developing world that have not had successful results. Election 
monitoring can encourage notions of democracy while contributing only cosmetically to 
a sense of democratization.   
It should be recognized that although election monitoring is intended to facilitate 
the process of democratization, elections are only one of the institutional prerequisites 
for democracy and that they are not in themselves sufficient to grant the title of 
                                                
20 Eric Bjornlund. Beyond free and fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. (Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004) 9. 
21 This has been said of the Carter Centers involvement in Ethiopias May 2005 elections. The Carter 
Center is a significant donor of aid in a number of areas, including health and citizen education. The Center 
declared that the 2005 elections in Ethiopia occurred in a free and fair manner. This declaration ran 
contrary to the reports made by a number of other electoral observers of the election including the 
European Unions electoral observer team. This leads one to question why the Carter Center declared the 
election as valid. Some would argue that the Carters center mandate induced the declaration because of the 
Centers involvement in other, non-political areas in Ethiopia.  
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democratic to an entire political regime.22 With this in mind we must take election 
monitoring for what it is. Election monitoring does not directly bring about 
democratization. Instead, the primary purpose of an election monitoring mission is to 
ensure the integrity of an election.  
An election conducted according to international and domestic standards is an 
expression of the popular will. Without a free and fair election, this process is 
compromised. In countries that have faced electoral difficulties or are transitioning, 
properly conducted election monitoring and observation missions can, in theory, ensure 
that the popular will is respected and reflected in selecting a government. The 
determination of whether or not an election has been conducted according to a free and 
fair standard has become an election monitors primary goal.  The question that remains 
is what is this free and fair standard?   
What is Free and Fair? 
  The credibility of elections has had a turbulent history in Africa. Beginning with 
founding elections, electoral discrepancies and fraud have been prevalent. While some, 
such as Osabu-Kle, have attributed these phenomena to the lack of culturally compatible 
forms of democracy23 others, such as Chebal and Daloz, have suggested that this simply 
reflects a trend toward the informalization of politics.24 Regardless of the cause, the 
notion of free and fair has gained significant importance as the validity of elections in 
Africa has come to rest on the free and fair criterion. In Africa, founding elections were 
                                                
22 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on EU Election 
Assistance and Observation. Retrieved on line at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com 
2000_0191en01.pdf on 19 March 2006. 
23 Daniel Osabu-Kle, Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2000), 13-29. 
24 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, African Issues, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1-31. 
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closely scrutinized by the international community and although many regimes were 
reluctant, international donor pressure increased the prevalence and reputation of election 
monitoring. According to Bratton and Van de Walle, between 1989 and 1994 twenty-one 
founding elections out of twenty-nine countries studied, were deemed to have held free 
and fair electoral contests.25  
It is important to recognize that in democracy promotion literature and in 
democracy development assistance discourse, the term free and fair has become a 
necessary and important electoral standard. The term, however, has become a catch 
phrase used by journalists, politicians, democracy promoters and political scientists. 
Rarely is it clearly defined. Critics of the phrase free and fair suggest that it has come to 
be used in a purely subjective manner.26 The lack of a clear and concrete definition 
allows for an open interpretation of basic democratic values and distorts the line between 
what is legitimate in terms of democratic values and principles and what is not. This is of 
particular importance because democracy development assistance providers often have 
differing mandates and agendas. In the case of election monitoring groups, this is 
especially true.   
Critics of the term free and fair often argue that it is easier to identify what is not 
free and fair than to actually establish what is.27 They claim that the term has no 
substance as it can be manipulated to meet organization mandates and pressures. Despite 
                                                
25 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 197. The countries studied that 
were deemed to have held a free and fair election were: Namibia, Cote dIvoire, Comoros, Cape Verde, 
Sao Tome, Benin, Zambia, Mali, Congo, Angola, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Lesotho, Burundi, 
Seychelles, Central African Republic, South Africa, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. Countries that 
did not hold free and fair elections included: Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, 
Gabon, Guinea.  
26 Guy Goodwin-Gill, free and fair Elections: International Law and Practice, (Geneva: Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1994) 2. 
27 Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2.  
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this powerful warning, international organizations including the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union and Transparency International, have sought to provide clarity to the concept 
rather than allowing it to simply fall into the wastebasket.   
According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, free and fair elections require the 
recognition and affirmation of three sets of rights. These include: voting and election 
rights (these establish universal, indiscriminately suffrage, secret balloting and the right 
to individual appeal in situation where individual rights are compromised); candidature, 
party and campaign rights (these establish that everyone has the right to participate in 
government, to express political opinions, to campaign, to have equal access to the 
media, to be free from political violence and to the protection of the law); and the rights 
and responsibilities of the state (these establish the state as responsible for the 
establishment of an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory process for registering 
voters, providing education on electoral procedures, and ensuring a non-partisan electoral 
commission exists).28 It should be noted that these three sets of rights are premised on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 21.3: 
 The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.29 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights serves as the foundational document in the 
academic debate about what constitutes a free and fair electoral contest 
Transparency International (TI) has taken a significantly different approach to 
defining the free and fair standard. According to TI, electoral legitimacy is of paramount 
                                                
28 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Declaration on Criteria for free and fair Elections Unanimously adopted by 
the Inter-Parliamentary Council in Paris, 26 March 1994, (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994). 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A 
(III) of 10 December 1948 Retrieved on line at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html on 25 March 2006.  
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importance in ensuring a stable political environment. In defining what makes an election 
free and fair, emphasis is placed on independent electoral commissions and transparency 
of polling mechanics. With an independent electoral commission, the ability of 
incumbents to manipulate the electoral process is greatly reduced. In regards to 
transparency, the polling process should be scrutinized by all parties. TI argues for 
sophisticated electoral procedures that include tagging electoral material with serial codes 
and closely recording the number of voters to ensure the free and fairness of the electoral 
contest.30  
The European Union (EU) suggests that in order for an election to be deemed free 
and fair, it must reflect basic human rights. In regards to elections the EU argues:  
To be truly free and fair they must be conducted in an atmosphere which is 
respectful of human rights. The right to take part in government through freely 
chosen representatives is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(article 21) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 
25).31 
The EU however, has recognized the inherent ambiguity of the phrase and has moved 
toward measuring whether or not an election has been conducted according to democratic 
standards.32 In the Handbook for European Union Election Observation Mission, free and 
fair is referred to as a sound bite for narrow assessment of an electoral process and is 
no longer promoted as a standard suitable to evaluate elections.33 This has become a 
common phenomenon as groups such as the Commonwealth have come to similar 
                                                
30 Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System (Berlin: 
Transparency International, 2000) 166.  
31 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on EU Election 
Assistance and Observation. Retrieved on line at  http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_ 
0191en01.pdf on 19 March 2006.  
32 European Union, Handbook for European Union Election Observation Mission, (Sweden: The Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002), 3. Retrieved on line at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/docs/handbook_en.pdf 
on 19 March 2005.  
33 Ibid. 
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conclusions. The Commonwealth currently assesses elections in terms of whether or not 
the will of the people has been expressed.34 The Commonwealth has argued this 
approach allows the observer group to note electoral abuses but still conclude whether or 
not the election had reached an international standard.35   
Although there have been a number if international forums and initiatives 
dedicated to establishing a clear description, free and fair remains a blanket term used to 
imply electoral validity. As Elklit and Svensson suggest: the phrase free and fair cannot 
denote compliance with a fixed, universal standard of electoral competition: no such 
standard exists, and the complexity of the electoral process makes the notion of any 
simple formula unrealistic.36 However, in order to provide an evaluation of election 
monitoring, a conception of the most basic standards of free and fair must be established. 
In a very comprehensive analysis titled What Makes Elections Free and Fair, 
authors Elklit and Jorgen set out to establish the most basic prerequisites for a free and 
fair electoral process. The authors argue that the freedom dimension should include 
elements relating to voters opportunity to participate in the election without coercion or 
restrictions of any kind.37  In regards to the fairness of an election, the authors refer to 
the notion of a level playing ground.38 Elklit and Jorgen have developed an extensive 
checklist for the criteria of free and fair that can be applied before, during and after the 
election day.39 While Elklit and Jorgen delineation provides a clear depiction of free and 
                                                
34 Amanda Sives, Election observation and Deepening the Common Wealth in The Round Table Vol. 361 
2001, 511. 
35 Ibid, 511. 
36 Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, What Makes Elections Free and Fair? in Journal of Democracy 
Vol. 8 No. 3 1997, 43. 
37 Ibid, 35. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Refer to Annex1 
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fair, it is important that we establish a clear understanding of the phrase and how it 
applies here.  
 In a general sense, it can be assumed that free and fair electoral practices are 
those that meet the most basic requirements of a nations electoral code. More 
specifically, these are electoral practices that work to fulfill the demand of democratic 
indicators as well as assist in the general capacity building of a nations political system.  
These practices include but are not limited to: an independent and non-partisan electoral 
commission; equal access to government owned/operated resources for incumbent and 
opposition parties; accessibility of electoral polls; freedom granted to opposition to 
campaign; universal, efficient and accessible voter registration, and strict regulations 
prohibiting and punishment of vote rigging and gerrymandering. It is only with a basic 
conception of free and fair that one can begin to explore and evaluate electoral 
monitoring.   
Conclusion 
Democracy theorists and the democracy development literature have placed a 
great deal of importance on electoral contests. Elections are deemed to be at the epicenter 
of democracy and free and fair elections are viewed as integral to the success of the 
democratic development of a nation. Election observation is premised on ensuring the 
quality of democracy. The literature suggests that with cleaner elections, the governing 
body becomes truly representative of the citizens will. Good governance should thus be 
the result of such an endeavor. The problem however, is that in many developing nations 
good governance does not necessarily follow. Despite increased international pressure 
and the presence of election monitors in nations deemed to be holding critical elections, 
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many nations fall into chaos after the election results are released. In some situations 
despite the grant by observers that the election met a standard of free and fair, citizens 
take to the street, opposition revolts and violence ensues. Election observation, although 
it can be a step in the right direction toward increasing democratic indicators, must work 
to ensure that the electoral contest indeed is conducted in a clean and fair manner and 
when discrepancies occur or problems arise, election observers should act as the vehicle 
in which those inconsistencies are revealed.  
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Introduction 
Election observation belongs to a set of development policy initiatives thought to 
facilitate good governance and democratic institutions in states struggling with 
democracy. However, election observation works primarily to promote both the citizens 
and the international communitys confidence in not only the electoral process but also in 
the ensuing government. In its infancy, election observations scope was limited as it was 
centered on gauging whether or not an election was conducted in a free and fair manner.40 
Election observation builds citizens confidence in the electoral process and it assures 
doubting parties that the election had been conducted according to the electoral code. 
This also works at the international level as the global community is able to gain 
confidence in the regime and believe that the election results reflect the will of the 
people. By establishing national and international confidence in the election, observers 
contribute to acceptance of the results and ensuing government.  
Democracy development promoters prescribed election monitoring in situations 
where the election is deemed to be of significant importance to the development of the 
nations democratic progress or when the election is perceived to be threatened by 
potential forces of manipulation. Election monitoring is designed to ensure that the 
election meets a free and fair standard and that it accurately reflects the will of the 
people. International and domestic monitoring is becoming an increasingly common and 
popular democracy development initiative that continues to garner more media attention 
than ever before. There is no standard formula that election monitors must follow; 
however, there are a number of international and domestic guidelines available. Because 
                                                
40 Jon Abbink, Rethinking Democratization and Election Observation, In Election observation and 
Democracy in Africa. edited by Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling. (New York, St. Martins Press, 2000), 4. 
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of the diversity associated with monitoring it is important to clearly identify the 
differences. 
 This chapter will begin with a description of the differences between monitoring 
and observing. Following this discussion is a report of domestic and international 
monitoring initiatives. There are many organizations involved in election monitoring 
initiatives. Organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations and the Carter 
Center are looked at to explain the different mandates and organizational structures of 
some international election monitoring initiatives. The Chapter ends with a discussion of 
the common criticisms that are made of election observers. In this section, criticisms 
surrounding the duration, the quality and the actual contributions of monitoring initiatives 
are discussed. Although election monitoring is intended to facilitate democratic 
development and peace, many critics claim that it has become a form of political tourism.   
The Difference between Election Monitoring and Observation  
There are three conditions that, when in place, contribute to the effectiveness of 
electoral observation. First, monitors who scrutinize the entire electoral process increase 
the effectiveness of electoral monitoring because they become fully aware of the political 
and social climate and are better able to assess the validity and legitimacy of the election. 
Second, when the incumbent is concerned about international legitimacy, monitors 
leverage comes from their access to world media and foreign governments. Jennifer 
McCoy states that if an incumbent does not seek international approval, the monitors 
leverage is considerably reduced.41 Third, when international donors have a commitment 
to democracy and free and fair elections, observers wield more power. The problem 
                                                
41 Jennifer McCoy, Monitoring and Mediating Elections in Latin America in Electoral Observation and 
Democratic Transitions in Latin America, edited by Kevin Middlebrook, (San Diego: Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies), 1998, 61. 
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however, is that many democracy development assistance agencies engaged in election 
monitoring are interested in ensuring the free and fairness of an election, but little else.  
It is important to draw a distinction between election monitoring and observation.  
Monitors are those who have witnessed and scrutinized the entire electoral process while 
observers are those who appear only on election day and leave immediately thereafter.42 
At the core of this distinction are the roles which the observer and the monitor play. 
Observers are those who are invited to audit an election, and observe the host nations 
democratic practices and institutions.43 The election monitor, on the other hand, is to 
evaluate the electoral process and assess its validity in terms of national and/or 
international standards.  
Typically observers are sent on short term missions. Because of their brief stays in 
the nation, they are only available to report blatant examples of electoral fraud such as 
ballot box stuffing, intimidation at the polls, and the accessibility of polling stations.  
Monitors are dispatched for a long-term mission and often arrive in the nation months 
prior to election day. Monitors have a broader mandate that encompasses a range of 
activities that go beyond scrutinizing the mechanics of an election. Long-term monitors 
may be involved in reporting incumbent behavior including legislative or constitutional 
changes; government sponsored violence and intimidation; and incumbent control and 
domination of the media.  
Monitoring missions are able to identify electoral manipulations that require 
investigation, time, and diligence to discover. Monitors typically meet with all parties 
involved in the election including the electoral board. They listen to grievances and 
                                                
42 McCoy, 60.   
43 This may include studying foreign election in order to improve elections at home. Common practices that 
are learned from this include new advancements in ballot tracking technologies.  
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attempt to uncover fraudulent practices. A monitor watches for the registration of 
deceased voters, underage registration and candidates who encourage and facilitate 
double voting. Often, monitors closely scrutinizes electoral boundaries in opposition 
zones, paying particular attention to whether or not boundaries have been drawn fairly 
and reflect equal population sizes. Monitors may also identify whether or not women 
have been granted a fair opportunity to be registered to vote. They may also pay attention 
to the media and analyze whether or not opposition and incumbent parties have received 
equal access to such resources. Also, an election monitor may monitor legislation, 
watching if laws have been passed or actions have been taken that would prevent 
opposition parties from campaigning freely. Monitors may also investigate whether or not 
internally displaced people, if present in the nation, have been given the opportunity to 
register to vote. Internally displaced people often make up a considerable percentage of 
the population and have often become disenchanted with the current governing regime. 
Without their vote, the quality of the election in terms of its ability to produce an 
outcome that truly reflects the popular will is greatly affected.  
Election monitors engage in tasks that must be undertaken prior to election day.  
While observers are able to report electoral fraud, their work lacks the thoroughness that 
only time prior to the election can afford. While both monitors and observers serve 
important purposes, the length of their missions and their mandates can lead them to draw 
different conclusions about the election.  
The Types of Monitoring Initiatives 
Election monitoring has caught the attention of the international community and 
become a prominent form of democracy assistance. Election monitoring can be found in 
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the mandates of national, inter-governmental, and non-governmental democracy 
development assistance platforms. Many states choose to act through international 
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) such as the European Union or 
the United Nations, while others choose to act through national agencies such as the 
Carter Center in the United States. It is important to recognize that a wide range of actors 
have become involved in the business of monitoring elections and that each 
organizations access to resources affects the manner in which its missions can be 
considered successful. For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on two types of 
monitoring/observation missions: international (missions conducted by governments, 
multilateral organizations or international non-governmental organizations), and domestic 
(missions conducted by non-partisan, non-governmental organizations and civic groups).  
Beginning with a look at international initiatives, the European Union, the United Nations 
and the Carter Center are excellent examples of modern organizations involved in 
monitoring. All three of these organizations differ in their mandate and their international 
reach. 
International Election Monitoring 
The EU is active in not only Europe, but also, around the globe. The EU has 
recognized the importance of international involvement in democracy assistance 
initiatives, and has become a supporter of international election monitoring missions. 
Since 2000, the EU has been involved in over thirty-five missions that have taken 
observers all over the world.44 The EU has acknowledged that democracy development 
assistance, and in particular election monitoring, provide a valuable and much needed 
                                                
44 European Union, EU Election Assistance & Observation:  Missions.  Retrieved on line at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/archive.htm, on 12 
March 2006.  
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service to the international community. Looking at the EU Election Assistance and 
Observation programs mandate, this is clear.   
During the last decade the process of democratization has manifested itself in many 
countries by the holding of multiparty elections for the first time. In some parts of the 
world, however, there have been clear reversals for democracy as well as dramatic and 
massive violations of human rights. Nevertheless democracy remains a universally valid 
system of governance, albeit one which needs to be backed up by constitutionally 
guaranteed rights so as to prevent apparently democratic elections from giving rise to 
illiberal democracy 
The promotion of genuine democracy and respect for human rights is therefore not only a 
moral imperative: it is also the determining factor in building sustainable human 
development and lasting peace. Actions in support of democratization and respect for 
human rights, including the right to participate in the establishment of governments through 
free and fair elections, can make a major contribution to peace, security and the prevention 
of conflicts45 
 
The European Parliament (EP) plays a significant role in determining the extent of 
EU participation in election monitoring. The general rule of thumb for EU involvement in 
election monitoring is that the EP should examine the possibility of sending an observer 
mission even if this is requested only by a minority, by part of a minority or by a 
consolidated association of citizens.46 Essentially, the EU is mandated to at least 
examine any request for electoral assistance, world wide.  However, it is important to 
note that the EP and its members reserves the right to determine the size, composition and 
level of involvement it will sponsor.47  This would explain why the EU, second only to 
the United Nations, is one of the largest international participators in election monitoring.   
 The UN Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) acts as a coordinator of election 
observers and monitors by working closely with national, inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations. The EAD is responsible for establishing a small secretariat 
                                                
45 European Union, The EU's Human Rights & Democratization Policy, EU Election Assistance & 
Observation. Retrieved on line at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human _rights/eu_ 
election_ass_observ/ on 12 March 2006.   
46 European Union, EU Election Assistance and Observation: European parliament resolution on the 
commission communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation (COM(2000)191-C5-0259/2000-
2000/2137 (COS)) in Official Journal of the European Communities Vol. 44 No. 343 (2001) 273. 
47 Ibid. 
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in the requesting country to help coordinate and provide logistical support to international 
election observers.48 United Nations participation is based on the particular needs of the 
requesting country. There is no standard prescription for the type of participation in 
which the UN will engage. In terms of electoral observation, the EAD is responsible for 
establishing a Joint International Observer Group (JIOG). A JIOG consists of UN 
member states, as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.49  The 
cost of a JIOG is covered by contributions from member states that are sponsoring 
observers.  According to the EAD, there are two advantages to this type of participation.  
The United Nations retains a low political profile while providing support to an 
important political process, and the approach is least intrusive of national 
sovereignty while at the same time providing the benefits of a coordinated 
international observation exercise.50 
 
The UNs involvement in electoral assistance is far greater than simply coordinating 
monitor activities. The UN is also active in providing technical assistance that includes 
assisting with voter and civic education; training of electoral officials; election budgeting; 
review of electoral laws and regulations; logistics; procurement of election materials; 
coordination of international donor assistance; electoral dispute resolution; 
computerization of electoral rolls; and boundary delimitation. 51 Countries often prefer 
the UN to regional bodies because the UN is seen as impartial and detached from 
regional and local politics.52 
The Carter Center, a privately funded institution unlike the UN and EU, has 
greater limitations in terms of its international participation in election monitoring. The 
                                                
48 Unites Nations, United Nations Electoral Assistance: Main types of Assistance. Retrieved on line at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/ea_content/ea_types_of_assist.htm, on 12 March 2006.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51Ibid.  
52 Beyond Intractability, Eric Graham, Election Monitoring (September 2004) Retrieved on line at 
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Carter Center was established by former President and First Lady, Jimmy and Rosalynn 
Carter of the United States. The Center, based out of Atlanta, is committed to advancing 
human rights and alleviating unnecessary human suffering.53 The organization not only 
provides electoral assistance, it also provides a wide range of development programs. The 
Carter Centers mandate is broad and includes: waging peace, fighting disease, and 
building hope by both engaging with those at the highest levels of government and 
working side by side poor and often forgotten people.54 In Africa alone, the Carter 
Center has been involved in twenty-nine countries and has provided a wide range of 
programming. In Ethiopia, the Carter Center has established a Public Health Training 
initiative which involves a number of programs including those designed to control 
Trachoma and River Blindness, to eradicate Guinea Worm Disease, to increasing food 
production, to mediate conflict, and to intervene for Human Rights.55   
Domestic Observation 
Domestic observer groups are those composed of individuals from the country 
hosting the election. They may be representatives of political parties or of civil society 
organizations that are committed to issues of democracy or human rights.56 Domestic 
observer groups can also be composed of individuals from professional associations, 
social services organizations, or of university students.57 Together, domestic observers 
encourage fairer election rules, better campaign practices and a more informed 
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54 Ibid. 
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electorate.58 Domestic observers are able to contribute to the quality of monitoring 
missions because they not only understand the language and culture of the nation, but 
also are well aware of the political situation in which the election is taking place. While 
some would question domestic observers on the grounds that they may lack impartiality 
and the necessary tools to successfully assess an election, domestic observes contribute to 
the broader entrenchment of democratic values and principles within a society. The 
sustainability of democracy is dependent on the presence of a strong civil society and an 
engaged and active citizenry. Domestic observers are able to contribute to the general 
democratic development of a nation is an important way.  
 In terms of resources, such as training and funding, international election 
monitors have distinct advantages over domestic groups. Firstly, donor support for 
domestic monitors has been significantly limited in comparison to international monitor 
initiatives. Thomas Carothers argues that this has been the case because donors still 
doubt the ability of domestic observers to be nonpartisan and because they prefer to 
spend their money on sending their own teams on what are usually popular, interesting 
trips to foreign locales. International monitoring initiatives typically have the ability to 
draw upon non-partisan, educated and well trained individuals to act as observers. They 
are usually well funded and precisely planned. They have greater logistical capacity and 
typically possess greater technical expertise. However, in terms of long term 
entrenchment, and even movement toward democratic consolidation, domestic observers 
efforts are superior.  
 
 
                                                
58 Ibid, 210. 
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Criticisms of Election Monitoring 
There is often a disconnection between the intentions of election monitoring and 
actual applications. As has been discussed, election monitoring in theory works to 
encourage democratic development and maintain adherence to democratic tenets. 
However, in practice, election monitoring has shown its weaknesses. There are several 
types of criticisms associated with election monitoring. The most common are those that 
deal directly with the duration of the monitoring mission. This criticism suggests that 
election monitors are not present in the observed country long enough to have a solid 
understanding of the political situation. The next criticism deals directly with the quality 
of the monitoring mission. Such criticisms argue that monitors are unable to fulfill their 
duties because of cultural barriers. The last type of criticisms deals with the monitors 
inability to make constructive contributions to nations democratic development because 
of institutional problems within the observed nation.  
Duration of Monitoring  
 In order for election observers to report their findings and to pass a verdict on the 
election, they must be able to weigh all the aspects of the electoral process. Often this is a 
difficult challenge because the observation mission has not been in the country long 
enough to have a comprehensive understanding of the electoral environment.59 Observers 
dispatched for short stints must rely on information gained prior to the mission to make 
their decisions. For instance, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), a 
group that dispatches short term electoral observation missions, recommends that their 
observers gain as much information as possible before they visit the polling station.60 The 
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CPA Guide for Election Observers suggests that information should be gleaned from 
foreign affairs departments and diplomatic missions, political party representatives, non-
governmental groups, the man on the street and the media.61 This presents somewhat of 
a problem. By relying on diplomatic reports and the media to gain an understanding of 
the electoral environment, the monitoring mission lacks the necessary attention to details 
required of quality election monitoring. For instance, the information gained prior to the 
election may not deal directly with how the political or social climate within the nation 
pertains directly to the success of a free and fair electoral contest. Also, relying on the 
media to gain information about the electoral atmosphere may result in biased, personal 
opinion based reports to go unchecked as facts.   
The electoral process begins prior to the actual election. In many nations, it is 
during the pre-election period that the greatest electoral problems arise and monitors 
should be present within the nation to identify these electoral malfeasances. A positive 
example is the 2006 Haiti election.  The presence of election monitors prior to the 
election day mobilized both regional and international attention and made known that 
there were a number of electoral problems such as election-related kidnappings.  
In December, several Provisional Electoral Council employees were abducted, as 
were 14 children from a school bus. Based on police reports, 30 kidnappings were 
reported in Haiti in November and another 30 during the first week of December 
alone.62 
 
Without the presence of election monitors prior to the election an accurate depiction of 
the electoral process and general political climate can not be gained. This is why many 
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election observer groups, including those assembled by the CPA, have received a great 
deal of criticism.  
 It is also argued that observers tend to pay a disproportionate amount of attention 
to the events of election day.63 When emphasis is placed on election day, the observer 
tends to produce favorable assessments. This is because most modern elections 
experience very little fraud at the polls. It is during the pre-election and post-election 
periods that the majority of problems occur.  As argued earlier, election day is only one 
part of the electoral process. The pre and post-election periods are just as much a part of 
the electoral process. As Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson suggest, observation missions 
consisting of short stays around the election day are fundamentally flawed.64 These two 
scholars suggest that the pre-election period is the most important to monitor because it is 
at this time that the election observer is able to determine whether the electoral law and 
constitution guarantee the freedom of the voters. This period is also significant to monitor 
because it can provide information important in determining whether or not there has 
been disproportionate access to media and other resources by the incumbency and the 
opposition.65 Electoral fraud goes beyond blatant displays of manipulation at the polling 
station. There are a number of games that the incumbents can play to inhibit the electoral 
success of the opposition. These games range from simple practices such as scheduling of 
elections at advantageous times, complicating voter registration processes and limiting 
the number of polling stations in ridings likely to elect opposition members, to full out 
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manipulating the constitution and other political institutions to ensure electoral victory.66 
All of these manipulations occur prior to the election and monitors should be in place to 
report and broadcast their findings.  
 In the post election period, the potential for electoral manipulation is also present. 
When observers leave the nation immediately or even shortly after the polls close, they 
are unable to witness and be present at the vote aggregation and tabulation processes. 
These processes are known to be susceptible to manipulative practices such as the 
unlawful disposal of ballots, ballot box stuffing and fraudulent vote counting. With such 
an understanding, it is clear why criticisms have been mounted against organizations that 
dispatch short term observers.      
The Quality of Monitoring 
 Another common criticism of election observation is that there exist barriers that 
prevent election monitors from accurately observing the election. Critics who comment 
on the quality of observation missions often point to cultural barriers such as language 
comprehension skills as major flaws in some electoral observation programs. Some 
critics have gone so far as to suggest that cultural barriers have caused some observation 
missions to resemble political theater more than a serious attempt to evaluate an 
election.67 A monitor who observed the 1993 election in Morocco noted:  
Most foreign observers do not know the language in which the elections are 
conducted, and are thus dependent either on translators provided by the local 
government, or on conversations with the people who speak their language.68 
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67 Henry Munson, International Election Monitoring: A Critique Based on One Monitors Experience in 
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Understanding the language is of great importance to the election monitoring mission. 
Without basic language skills, the monitor is unable to gain an accurate picture of the 
electoral contest. Election monitors should be able to understand the local news media, 
understand local radio and television broadcasts and talk with citizens about the electoral 
processes. Without such skills, an observer is unable to assess the quality of the election, 
the role of the incumbent and the position of the opposition. More important, without 
language skills a monitor is unable to understand the ballots, the electoral codes and the 
electoral procedures. While a monitor can employ the assistance of interpreters this raises 
financial issues. It is far more costly to hire observers and interpreters than to simply 
employ individuals who speak the language and understand the political environment. 
Groups that send individuals to foreign locals to monitor elections should recognize the 
importance of language comprehension in electoral observation. Without language skills, 
the observer is susceptible to misunderstanding information, overlooking major electoral 
problems, and in general, misevaluating the electoral process.   
Some have also suggested that international monitors often do not have an 
understanding of the cultural and political situation of the nation and are unable to 
differentiate major from minor discrepancies. Observers are sent to monitor elections in 
nations that have different cultural practices. It may be hard for an observer to understand 
political activities that differ greatly from practices found at home. Misunderstanding the 
observed nations culture could cause the monitors to evaluate the election in a harsh 
manner. It is on this ground that domestic observers are promoted as contributing the 
most to election monitoring initiatives. Not only does the presence of domestic monitors 
contribute to the general capacity building of the nation, but also, domestic observers 
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understand the language and culture and are more able to accurately report electoral 
discrepancies or triumphs.  
Another criticism made is that observers are not qualified for the positions that they 
hold. This criticism is aimed at groups that recruit individuals with little to no experience 
with democracy promotion and even less experience understanding election processes. 
Individuals that would fall into this category inhibit the electoral monitoring process 
because they are unfamiliar with acceptable and unacceptable electoral standards. It 
should be noted that this criticism can not apply to all observation missions. For instance 
the Commonwealth Observers Group claims that it composes its membership base from a 
group of respected, qualified, experienced people who have an understanding of, and 
background in, elections, politics, law or the judiciary.69 In fact, many of the 
Commonwealths observes are prominent public and government officials. For instance, 
the Commonwealth Observer team for the 2003 Nigerian election was lead by the former 
Tanzanian Prime Minister, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim. The same observer mission included 
Ron Gould (Former Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Canada), Mr Gabriel Mukele (Vice-
Chairman Electoral Commission, Kenya) and Mr M A Syed (Chief Election 
Commissioner, Bangladesh).70 
Another general type of criticism that has been made of some observation missions 
is the amateur nature of some groups. While there are a great number of organizations 
that provide quality monitoring missions and that have well established mandates,71 there 
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is also an array of international organizations that create ad-hoc monitoring missions, 
without long term mandates and inadequate access to resources. Organizations belonging 
to this second group have been described as mere dabblers who come in for high-profile 
elections, with short-term, poorly prepared delegations.72 These are often organizations 
that are mandated to promote human rights and human development. These organizations 
often have only a vague understanding of electoral processes and an even vaguer 
understanding of monitoring. These are groups that do little for the reputation of election 
monitoring. Often, they deliver hasty post-election statements that can not possibly 
represent an actual depiction of the electoral process. An example of such a group can be 
drawn from the 2004 Ukraine presidential elections.  In 2004 a group of former American 
Democratic congressmen observed the vote. These individuals declared that the election 
had been conducted in a free and fair manner and that the processes had been geared 
toward the finest methods of ensuring fairness and accuracy.73 The former 
Congressmens positive assessments ran counter to those of most other observer groups, 
including the American State Department and a coalition of European monitors, who all 
cited widespread electoral discrepancies.74 Prior to the Ukraine mission, this group had 
not been active in electoral monitoring.  
Organizations that engage in democracy development assistance as well as a 
number of other political, economic and social development missions have also been 
criticized. Some organizations are criticized because of their ad-hoc, poorly funded 
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election monitoring. Other organizations have come under attack because their 
evaluations are perceived to be guided by other factors. For instance countries that are 
deemed to be of strategic importance and to which institutions identify interest are often 
given wider leeway as to what constitutes free and fair electoral practices. Needless to 
say the quality of international monitoring missions has experienced heightened scrutiny.  
Constructive Contributions 
 A common criticism is that despite the presence of monitors, electoral 
malfeasance still occurs. As Thomas Carothers notes, 
Although international election observation has developed considerably over the 
last decade and has helped improve elections in many countries, it is not a cure-
all. Flawed or even fraudulent elections still occur frequently despite the presence 
of international observers.75    
By virtue of the political situation and the structural and institutional obstacles evident in 
the governing structure, election observers are limited in what they are able to do. 
Although observers can add a sense of legitimacy to the electoral process, observers can 
not ensure that polarized political factions cooperate, they can not counter the deeply 
anti-democratic instincts of strongmen intent on holding on to power76 nor can they 
ensure that anything meaningful will be done if they do find electoral frauds. Marina 
Ottaway makes clear that many nations around the world are riddled with these structural 
obstacles and democracy development assistance, in particular election monitoring, can 
do little to contribute to the consolidation or even further democratization of the nation.  
 Ottaway discusses the relevance of structural conditions in the democratization 
process. She argues that there exist economic, political and cultural realities that hinder 
democracy development in nations around the globe. She is careful to explain that these 
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forces do not depend on the choices made by specific regimes or leaders.77 These are 
trends that would influence the political process under any leadership.  
The most significant of the structural problems identified by Ottaway involve the 
various problems associated with state formation. Ottaway argues that democracy 
promoters focus more attention on the political system than on the actual process and 
problems associated with state formation. Semi-authoritarian78 regimes emerge because 
there is an absence of institutions capable of checking the power of leaders. In semi-
authoritarian states power is not generated through formal political institutions and 
processes but is instead held in the individual.79 Ottaway notes that elections in such 
states do little to change this situation. Also, in many nations the political elite are not 
strongly embedded nor do they represent the vast majority of the population. As elites 
play an integral role in politics, Ottaway argues the key to initiating further [political] 
change in semi-authoritarian states is to make democracy relevant to the rest of the 
population. While international election observation can assist democratic development 
in a nation it can do little for actual democratic consolidation.  
Conclusion 
Both election monitoring and observation have become tools utilized and 
promoted by the international community. It should be recognized that although election 
monitoring is intended to facilitate the process of democratization, elections are only 
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one of the institutional prerequisites for democracy and that they are not in themselves 
sufficient to grant the title of democratic to an entire political regime.80 Election 
monitoring does not directly bring about democratization. Instead, the primary purpose of 
an election monitoring mission is to ensure the integrity of an election.  
Internationally, Western Democracies have contributed to the democratic 
development of nations around the world. With the practice of election observation, in 
many instances, the international community has been able to legitimize the electoral 
process by voicing findings and sharing them with the global community. There are, 
however, problems. The duration, quality and contributions of monitoring initiatives have 
come under attack and their flaws have been broadcast. However, election monitoring is 
still a highly valued initiative in the democracy development field. Since competitive 
elections remain the most significant dimensions of a liberal democracy, that one can 
argue that election observation missions will continue to serve as a legitimizing tool. 
There is a problem with the current international discourse on election 
monitoring. Democracy promoters have preferred to send international observers rather 
than to support domestic groups. This is representative of a larger problem in foreign 
assistance, the tendency to focus on short term outcomes.81 Domestic observation 
contributes to the capacity building of the nation as citizens become actively engaged in 
holding the electoral process accountable.  
In the following chapter, a detailed discussion of an election monitoring mission 
is studies. In May 2005, Ethiopia held its third set of national elections. The Ethiopia case 
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is unique because of the international election monitoring involvement. Both the Carter 
Center and the European Union monitored the elections, however, each organization 
came to different conclusions about the validity of the elections. 
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Introduction 
On 15 May 2005 Ethiopia held its third general election since the adoption of its 
democratic constitution in 1994. Ethiopians went to the polls to elect 547 members for 
the House of Peoples Representatives. At the same time, the electorate cast ballots for 
the nine Regional State Councils and two City Councils.82 With a population of 72 
million people, approximately 25, 605, 851 million Ethiopians 18 years of age and older 
were registered to vote.83 Throughout the nation more than 32, 000 polling stations were 
created. The voter turnout was high with approximately 82 per cent of registered voters 
casting ballots for more than 36 political parties that were registered to participate in the 
election.84   
The Ethiopian government invited members of the international community to 
observe and monitor the elections. The European Union (EU), the African Union, the 
Carter Center and the Arab league were all present. These four reputable organizations 
with clear monitoring mandates followed the pre and post-election political and social 
climate. Each group worked independently of the others and determined the size and 
scope of their own missions. The Carter Center and the EU both had a sizable presence in 
the nation sending a combined total of more than 200 observers. In the post election 
period and after the publication and announcement of very different reports on the 
validity of the electoral process and outcome, a great deal of criticism arose regarding the 
                                                
82 The nine Regional States are the Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harar, Oromia, Somali, 
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Amnesty International, Ethiopia: The 15 May 2005 Elections and Human Rights, April 2005. Retrieved on 
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accuracy of each report. Charges were made against the Carter Center for reporting 
favorably on the election despite mounting evidence pointing to gross electoral 
manipulation and fraud. The Center also came under attack for declaring the elections as 
free and fair prior to release the election results. The EU was criticized by the incumbent 
regime and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia85 for issuing a report that was too 
harsh and unreflective of the election. The electoral board went so far as to declare the 
EU report as highly biased, self-contradictory and thus very destructive.86 The 2005 
Ethiopian elections provide a provocative look into problems associated with 
international election monitoring. Paying particular attention to the reports issued by the 
Carter Center and the European Union, the political and social consequences of election 
monitoring are revealed.   
This chapter will begin with a brief political history of Ethiopia with particular 
emphasis on the nations struggle for democratization. Looking at the nations 1995 and 
2000 elections it is clear that this has been a long and shaky process. In 2005 there were 
great expectations surrounding the elections. 2005 would mark the first time the 
government would openly invite the international community and those involved in 
democracy promotion to closely scrutinize the electoral process. This would also be the 
first time the nation would experience a truly multiparty election.87 Although the 2005 
elections were touted as the most democratic the nation had ever seen, more than one 
year later it appears that these elections faced a number of electoral problems. The pre- 
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and post-election day periods were riddled with discrepancies. While both the Carter 
Center and the EU reported many of the same electoral inconsistencies, the two 
organizations came to very different conclusions.   
History 
 Ethiopia has had a turbulent political history. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Italians had established Eritrea as a coastal enclave and were interested in 
acquiring Ethiopia as a colony. To their disappointment, Ethiopia managed to stave off 
European occupation and became the only African nation to successfully defend itself 
during the scramble for Africa.88  By the 1930s Benito Mussolini was determined to 
construct an African empire and take Ethiopia once and for all. In 1936, following a 
seven month campaign, the capital city of Addis Ababa fell to the Italians and the 
Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie fled to the United Kingdom.89 In 1941 Emperor 
Selassie was able to return to Ethiopia and regain his thrown with the assistance of the 
British. He remained in power until 1974.  
By the 1970s popular discontent for Emperor Selassie began to grow. The 
Emperor was accused of failing to address the famine and drought crisis that had plagued 
the countrys Wollo region. Also, Selassie had refused to name an heir despite his old age 
and near-senility.90 After a series of army mutinies and civilian protests, Selassie was 
dethroned by the Derg91 and by 1975 the monarchy was formally abolished. As the Derg 
dismantled the Selassie government, Mengistu Haile Maryam rose to the highest ranks of 
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the organization and emerged as the nations new leader.92 Maryams dictatorship lasted 
for 13 years until he was overthrown in May of 1991 by the Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was a coalition of opposition 
forces that had deep allegiances to Marxism and socialist thinking.93 Rather than citing 
class and economic oppression as the major source of unrest in the nation, tense ethnic 
relations were perceived to be the largest problems plaguing Ethiopia.94 At the National 
Conference of Peace and Reconciliation held in June of 1991, the strongest of the 
opposition forces, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) set the terms for the 
transition. 95  Meles Zenawi, the leader of the TPLF would play a significant role.  
Ethiopia had long been a recipient of Western assistance. In particular, the United 
States and the European Union have taken a special interest in the nation. In 1991 the 
Western donor community, under the leadership of the United States, facilitated the 
political transition from the Mengistu reign to that of the EPRDFs regime. Mengistu was 
exiled to Zimbabwe to prevent those loyal to the former dictator from rioting and 
perpetuating violence within the capital city of Addis Ababa. With the United States 
approval and support, the EPRDF led the provisional government with Meles Zenawi as 
the Prime Minister.96  
In 1991 the transitional government began the reorganization of the Ethiopian 
administrative apparatus. Twelve regions and two cities were established and each had 
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been granted the same political status. The lines for these divisions were drawn on the 
basis of ethnicity. Each region was given power over their own security, budget, 
language, and cultural affairs.97 The transitional government recognized that very few 
political groups existed and that ethnic issues were the source of civil strife. According to 
Terrence Lyons, rather than denying ethnic or national differences or trying to bolster a 
sense of pan-Ethiopian identity, the EPRDF chose to construct a political system that 
reflected the on going realities [of the nation].98 The problem however, was that these 
boundaries, drawn to be as ethnically homogenous as possible, became the subject of 
controversy. Many elites and some political leaders felt as though the attempt at ethnic 
federalism sacrificed the historical Ethiopian national identity and sense of pride.99 Many 
ethnic groups, including the Oromo people of the South and the Somali people felt 
`ethnic federalism was an attempt to co-opt them into a Northern dominated 
government. The result was a series of secessionist movements and further political 
turmoil that led up to the 1994 instatement of a constitution.100 The Constitution was 
designed to bring an end to the instability of the nation. However, the installment of the 
constitution resulted in two consecutive terms of EPRDF dominated government.   
  Many observers declared that the 2005 elections served as a bench mark in terms 
of Ethiopias democratic development. Despite two previous national elections in 1995 
and 2000, Ethiopia had never experienced a truly competitive, multi-party electoral 
contest.101 During the 1995 elections opposition parties boycotted the process allowing 
                                                
97Ibid., 9. 
98 Terrence Lyons, Closing the Transition: The May 1995 election in Ethiopia in The Journal of Modern 
African Studies Vol. 34, No. 1 1996, 124. 
99 Ibid., 125. 
100 Ibid., 126. 
101 Refer to Annex2 
 52
the EPRDF to maintain its stranglehold on Parliament. The 1995 elections resulted in 
Ethiopia remaining a single party state as the EPRDF took 483 seats out of 548.  In 2000 
the EPRDF again won a parliamentary majority and Zenawi begun his second official 
term. The 2000 elections results proved that the EPRDF was determined to maintain its 
control. The party won 481 seats out of 547 and parties that were closely affiliated with 
the EPRDF took 37 seats. The remaining seats went to independents.  
The 2005 elections marked the first genuine multi-party contest in Ethiopias 
history. The EPRDF had opened up enough political space to allow a number of 
opposition groups to organize and create a significant presence in the nation. Opposition 
groups had been able to garner popular support and participate in political debate. An 
opposition coalition was established that would prove to be the EPRDFs biggest political 
threat, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). The CUD was composed of 
members from the Ethiopia Democratic League, the All Ethiopian Unity Party, the 
United Ethiopian Democratic Party (Medhin Party), and Rainbow Ethiopia: Movement 
for Democracy and Social Change. The United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) 
also posed a serious challenge. 
Officially, in 2005 the CUD captured 109 seats out of the 547 seats available.102 
However, in the post election period many speculated that the actual number of seats won 
in the election by the CUD was actually significantly higher. Some believed that the 
CUD had actually won the elections and allegations mounted against the electoral board 
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for acting as a puppet of the EPRDF.103 Of course the official electoral records show that 
the EPRDF won the election, winning 327 seats out of the 547. Despite the allegations of 
gross electoral manipulation, the EPRDF took up their seats and continued to dominate in 
the Ethiopian House of Peoples Representatives.   
In 2005, the remaining seats were assigned as follows. The UEDF gained fifty-
two seats in the House. The Somali Peoples Democratic Unity Organization captured 
twenty-four seats. The Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement gained eleven seats, the 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front won eight seats, the Afar National 
Democratic Party also won eight seats, the Gambela Peoples Democratic Movement 
took three seats, the Sheko and Mezenger Peoples Democratic Unity Organization won 
one seat, the Harari National League also took one seat, and the Argoba National 
Democratic Organization gained one seat. There was also one independent elected.104 
Prior to Election Day 
 In the months leading up to the May 2005 elections, political parties prepared for 
the upcoming contest. During this time, both international and domestic observers began 
the process of monitoring the pre-election political climate. The government of Ethiopia 
had promised that it would uphold its commitment to facilitate a truly free and fair 
election. However, prior to the election a number of questionable events occurred that 
pointed to the manipulation of the electoral process and the means by which it would be 
monitored.   
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A number of domestic observer groups were disqualified from participation by 
the Electoral Board before the election began. The Electoral Board determined that local 
non-governmental organizations that had not established electoral observation or 
monitoring within their mandates would be barred from observing and reporting on the 
election. Although this decision was eventually overthrown by the Supreme Court, the 
decision came late in the election. This prevented some groups from mobilization and 
hindered the development of a large and well organized group of domestic observers.105 It 
was clear that the Zenawi government was not going to allow groups to monitor the 
election that did not have a clear mandate to do so.  
Also, six weeks prior to the election, six United States government funded groups 
assisting in the preparations necessary for the May elections were expelled from the 
nation. The International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the 
International Foundation for Elections Systems were among the groups asked to leave. 
The Zenawi government claimed that these institutions had been interfering in local 
matters and were working without permits.106 Officials from the groups claim that they 
had gone through the appropriate measures and that the Ethiopian government was well 
aware of their work prior to their start dates. Some of the groups expelled were providing 
administrative and financial support to opposition groups.107 Despite the EPRDFs 
commitment to transparency and international observation, the Zenawi government made 
clear that Ethiopian affairs were not to be interfered with.  
                                                
105 European Union Election Observation Mission Ethiopia 2005, Preliminary Statement, Hilton Hotel, 
Addis Ababa, 17 May 2005. Retrieved on line at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_ 
rights/eu_ election_ass_observ/ethiopia/pre_stat_17-05-05.pdf on 3 November 2005.  
106 International News: U.S. Poll Watchers Without Permits Ordered Out of Ethiopia April 14-April 20, 
2005, The New York Amsterdam News, 2.  
107Ibid. 
 55
Also, about a month before the election, the EPRDF began to crack down on the 
political space of the opposition and to change its tone regarding opposition parties 
campaigns. For instance, the EPRDF claimed and publicized that the opposition was 
determined to engage in ethnic genocide, and referred to opposition candidates as 
individuals comparable to those who belonged to the Interahamwe.108 The name 
Interahamwe was used to invoke the memory of the Rwandan genocide and compare 
opposition parties to groups of individuals willing to engage in gross crime against 
humanity. Also, a number of CUD party poll watchers and supporters were arrested and 
given jail sentences.109 On 13 May 2005, the CUD along with other opposition parties 
gave a joint press conference urging the EPRDF to allow citizens to vote freely. Also 
prior to the election, opposition members made numerous reports to international 
observers as well as the national electoral board regarding alleged intimidation sponsored 
by the ruling EPRDF. A number of opposition candidates claimed that the ruling party 
was using coercive measures to disrupt the electoral process. In Zenawis constituency 
UEDF candidates claimed that they were forced to drop out of the race after receiving 
death threats.110 
 Due to security issues, elections for the Somali region were scheduled three 
months after the general elections on 21 August. Immediately before the August 
elections, opposition candidates from the Western Somali Democratic Party, the 
Coalition of Somali Democratic Forces, and the Dall-Wabi Peoples Democratic 
movement threatened a boycott. Opposition groups claimed that their supporters had been 
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threatened; voter cards had been stolen; and voter cards could be found for sale in local 
markets.111 In July, tensions surrounding the Somali region elections exploded and five 
people were killed in a grenade attack.112   
The pre-election period witnessed mounting political tension between opposition 
groups and the ruling EPRDF government. The incumbent, losing security in its ability to 
maintain political control, reverted to undemocratic techniques. Expelling international 
observers, limiting domestic observation, and engaging in intimidation were actions that 
constituted only the beginning of a long list of electoral irregularities. In the post election 
period, this list would grow, as some of the most shocking and undemocratic electoral 
maneuvers would be revealed.       
The Post Election Period 
 Following the closing of polls on 15 May 2005 an approximately four week long 
vote tabulation process commenced. The official election results were to be released on 8 
June however two days after the polls closed the EPRDF claimed an electoral victory.113 
This came as a shock too many. All parties involved in the elections had agreed to wait 
until the national electoral board released all of the results to make any electoral claims. 
As the vote counting process was slated to take several weeks, the EPRDF had 
disregarded the pact in order to reclaimed power within the House of Peoples 
Representatives.  
Prime Minister Zenawi also issued a thirty day prohibition against mass 
demonstrations in the capital of Addis Ababa. This was an illegal move on the part of the 
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government. According to Ethiopian law, freedom of assembly can only be compromised 
during a declared state of emergency.114 The Zenawi government declared that this 
measure would prevent confrontations and violence within the city.115 Shortly after the 
declaration on 17 May 2005, police opened fire on a group of demonstrators who were 
alleging the elections had been manipulated. More than 35 people were killed.116 Also, 
opposition party support staff and officials were arrested following the election. Ahilu 
Shawel, Chairman of the CUD and Lidetu Ayalew, a senior CUD official, were placed 
under house arrest.117  
Election results, scheduled to be released on 8 June were officially postponed 
because, according to the electoral board, it had received an overwhelming number of 
complaints.118 Kemal Bedri, chairman of the electoral board declared that due to the scale 
of the complaints a month long delay was necessary.119 The Electoral board received a 
variety of complaints that included a number of polling stations allegedly closing their 
doors prior to the designated poll closing time.120 Also, allegations were made that in 
some constituencies, the number of ballots exceeded the number of registered voters.121 
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Opposition groups accused the EPRDF and its supporters of destroying ballot boxes that 
would be needed for possible recounts in disputed constituencies.122  
In the absence of international and domestic observers and the media in rural 
constituencies, charges alleging widespread fraud were made.123 Activities such as 
preventing opposition party agents from being present at the polls and disposing of ballot 
boxes was said to be common place.    
The charges laid by the opposition groups triggered conflicting accusations from 
the ruling party.124 Spokesperson for the EPRDF, Simon Bereket claimed that the ruling 
party had evidence that opposition groups had stuffed ballot boxes, photocopied ballot 
papers for multiple use and tried to stop women from voting in two of the most hotly 
contested regions.125  
 In the months following the May election, reports of intimidation, coercion and 
violence sponsored by the EPRDF were reported by Human Rights Watch. Peter 
Takirambudde, director of Human Rights Watch's Africa Division, noted that the ruling 
party had been engaging in intimidation, arbitrary detentions and excessive force in rural 
areas of Ethiopia to suppress post-election protests and all potential dissent.126 Human 
Rights Watch also noted that the Ethiopian government is violently suppressing any 
form of protest and punishing suspected opposition supporters.127 
 The political situation within the nation also deteriorated. The EPRDF majority 
in the House of Peoples Representatives revised the Houses Provisions of Parliament 
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Procedures.128 This act reduced the role of opposition Members in the House by 
allowing only the governing party to introduce bills that deal with financial issues.129 
Also, the Speaker of House was given the sole authority to determine the legislative 
agenda and determine which proposed opposition items would be heard.130 
Reviewing the pre and post election climate in Ethiopia illustrates the EPRDFs 
determination to maintain order and control. These periods were scrutinized by the 
international observer community. Both the Carter Center and the European Union were 
present in the nation, however, each group had its own mandate and set of operating 
procedures.  
The Carter Center 
 The Carter Center has a long history of involvement in Ethiopia and with the 
Zenawi government. Beginning in 1992, the Centers political involvement consisted of 
assisting and facilitating the drafting of a constitution.131 The Center has also assisted in 
arranging war crime trials.132 After accepting an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Carter Center sent a 
preliminary assessment team to the nation in January of 2005. Shortly after the 
preliminary mission, the Carter Center opened an office in Addis Ababa on 19 March 
2005. In total the Carter Center dispatched fifty monitors to Ethiopia. The delegation was 
led by Jimmy Carter and co-lead by former President of Botswana Ketumile Joni Masire 
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and former Tanzanian Prime Minister Joseph Warioba. According to Carter, the observer 
team had unimpeded access to opposition leaders, polling sites and other aspects of the 
electoral process.133 
  The delegation was present in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and seven other regions. 
In Addis Ababa, the team visited approximately 40 polling stations. In the Centers Trip 
Report, the only polling site problem occurred in the eastern area of Addis Ababa. 
According to Carter, local election officials had assigned more than 4,500 voters to each 
of a half dozen voting places in violation of the electoral board 1,500 person limit per 
site.134 The Center resolved the situation by notifying the electoral board and having 
them announce that voters waiting in line when the poll closed would still be able to vote.  
The Centers delegation was also present for some of the polls closing and counting 
procedures. Carter declared that these processes were carried out without noticeable 
incidents.135 
 As early as 19 May 2005 the Carter Center made clear that the 2005 elections 
represented a bench mark in terms of democratic development for Ethiopia. 
While there were serious problems in the run up to the elections, many positive 
strides were made. Depending on the transparency and fairness of the tabulation and 
publication of results, the election could represent a quantum move forward in 
democratization for Ethiopia.136 
 
These sentiments were carried further in the Centers Final Statement published 15 
September 2005 after the vote tabulation process was complete and the results were made 
public.  
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In contrast with previous elections, the 2005 elections were sharply contested and 
offered Ethiopian citizens a democratic choice for the first time in their long 
history. The ruling party took the initiative to negotiate with the opposition and 
level the playing field, and agreed to a number of electoral reforms that created 
conditions for a more open and genuinely competitive process. The early 
negotiations between parties were, in and of themselves, a step forward for the 
democratization process in Ethiopia.137  
 
The Center noted minor discrepancies and post-election problems in its final statement. 
The problems noted by the Center were those concerning the electoral complaints 
resolution process.  
 According to the Carter Center, the Complaints Review Board (CRB) and the 
Complaints Investigation Board (CIB) established after violence broke out in June 2005 
did not provide an adequate or fair mechanism to hear grievances. The Carter Center 
observed minor irregularities concerning the CRB and its decisions to reject complaints 
from polling stations in constituencies that were already under review. The most 
significant observation made by the Carter Center concerning the complaints process 
related to the CIP. According to the Center, the CIP process was not executed in a 
uniform fashion across constituencies, [and there were] potential consequential 
inconsistencies in the application of rule for the admission of evidence and witness.138     
 The Carter Center concluded its final report by discouraging Parliamentarians, 
especially those belonging to opposition parties, from engaging in a boycott or harboring 
animosity.  
We urge the leaders of the new parliament, both ruling party and opposition, to 
work together to devise new rules and practices to ensure that all voters interests 
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are represented in parliament, and that the upcoming 2006 Woreda and 2010 
national elections build on the gains made during the 2005 elections.139 
 
The Carter Center declared the 2005 Ethiopian elections to be legitimate and 
representative of the popular will. The Carter Center encouraged Ethiopians and the 
international community to accept the results and declared the election to be 
representative of a significant step toward the further democratization of the nation. 
 The Carter Center election observation mission has sparked international 
attention. The United States State Department has accepted the Centers assessment and 
evaluation of the elections. The State Department has since based its policy toward 
Ethiopia on the Centers recommendations.140 
The European Union 
 The European Union election observation mission lead by Ana Gomes deployed 
160 observers to Ethiopia. A core team of nine staff members arrived in the nation on 18 
March 2005, approximately two months prior to the scheduled election day. The EU 
deployed an additional fifty long term observers in mid April and another 100 short term 
observers in early May. The missions mandate was to be present in all regions of the 
country and cover the election campaign, polling and the counting of ballots up to the 
announcement of the official results.141  
On the 24 May 2005, the EU released an updated mission statement. In this 
document the observer team offered a message of regret.  
The European Union Election Observation Mission regrets the way in which the 
counting of the votes at the constituency level is being conducted as well as the way 
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in which the release of results is being handled by the electoral authorities, the 
government, and the political parties, especially the EPRDF.142 
 
The EU pointed to four events that caused them great concern, namely the illegal claim of 
victory by the incumbents on 16 May 2005; the slow release of electoral results by the 
electoral board; EPRDF dominated media; and the failure of the media to report the EUs 
critical comments about the election.143   
 According to the EU, the conduct of the Ethiopian Government, the Electoral 
Board and EPRDF officials had undermined the transparency and fairness of the election 
and increased the opportunity for manipulation.144 In the EUs Final Report, the observers 
declare that the election fell short of international principles for genuine democratic 
elections.145 The observers again pointed to the lack of transparency in the voting, 
counting and aggregation processes, and the inability of the appeals process to remedy 
complaints.  However, in the final report the EU went further and discussed serious 
concerns regarding Ethiopian electoral practices and electoral law.146 Constituency 
sizes, restrictions on the number of candidates, vagueness in electoral law regarding vote 
counting and aggregation and the publication of results were raised as issues of concern. 
The EU also pointed to criminal legislation relating to the media as an area that the 
Ethiopian government needed to address in order to develop more democratic tenets.   
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 The EU also discussed the conduct of the electoral board. The EU suggested that 
the electoral board did not enjoy the confidence of opposition parties and it 
contributed to the significant delays in the counting and aggregation process.147 Like the 
Carter Centers report, the EU also noted that there were problems with the Complaints 
Investigation Panels. However, the EU report was more thorough and discussed its 
concerns for the relatively poor training offered to, and received by, election officials. 
The EU found that lower level election commissioners were insufficiently trained and 
were susceptible to pressure from EDRDF officials. The EU also noted conflict of 
interest issues, suggesting that many of the election officials were also government 
officials.  
 The gravest of all EU concerns was for the government sponsored human rights 
abuses that became frequent and commonplace in the post-election period. Following the 
election the EU noted that the government engaged in repressive practices, detaining 
more than 500 students and journalists between 5 June and 7 June.148 By late June the EU 
reported that the Federal Police had detained 3,132 individuals. On 12 June, Tesfaye 
Adane Jara, a newly elected opposition official, was gunned down by the police. Other 
opposition candidates were harassed and some were put under house arrest without legal 
authorization and prosecution.149 The EU also reported individuals affiliated with the 
EPRDF had targeted civil society organizations. The EU reported that members of the 
Ethiopian Human Rights Council were arrested. 
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 The EU concluded its report by stating that the elections fell short of 
international principles for genuine elections.150 The EU made a long list of 
recommendations that included adjusting the legal framework for conducting future 
elections, rectifying the electoral administration issues, cleaning up the complaints review 
process, insuring freedom for the media, and further encouraging the participation of 
women. Unlike the Carter Centers report, the EU final statement was not received well 
by Ethiopian authorities. 
The re-elected Zenawi government was quick to condemned the EU report. On 
August 29th, Zenawi made a public statement declaring the EU observation reports as a 
pack of lies.151 He went so far as to call Ana Gomes a self appointed colonial 
Viceroy.152 Zenawi has insinuated that relations between the EU and Ethiopia would 
deteriorate as a result of the report.153 In response to the European Unions Electoral 
Observation Final Report, the electoral board was also quick on the defensive. The 
Electoral Board denied allegations of partisan activity and the failure of its Complaints 
Investigation Panels.154  
Conclusion 
 The 2005 Ethiopian election provides an insightful look into the nature of election 
observation. Between the Carter Center and the European Union, more than 200 
international election observers monitored the election. This marked monumental 
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progress for the nation as this was the first time in its history that the government had 
invited officials to scrutinize the electoral process. However, democratic development 
would not unfold in Ethiopia the way many had speculated. In the post election period 
protest broke out and government violence and repression ensued. Ethiopia, a nation with 
a proud political history, fell into the throws of disorder. In an attempt to regain 
legitimacy, the EPRDF sided with the Carter Centers assessment of the election and 
refuted the harsher and more critical report issues by the European Union. Opposition 
supporters on the other hand looked to the European Union report as a message of hope. 
In the post election period the two reports have been used as political fuel in the struggle 
for political power in Ethiopia. Chapter six details the politicization of the Carter Centers 
and EUs electoral observation reports.     
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Introduction 
The 2005 Ethiopian elections stand out in Ethiopian history as the first truly 
multi-party, democratic contest the nation had ever witnessed. The elections were also 
supposed to kick start the stalled democratization process. International monitors were 
invited to the nation to verify the elections and report on whether or not the elections met 
the criterion of free and fair. While the reports of both the Carter Center and the EU did 
attempt to assess the validity of the electoral process, their differing conclusions have left 
a lasting legacy.  
 The final statements of the Carter Center and EU have become part of Ethiopian 
history for very uncommon reasons. Although the reports were intended to be unbiased, 
impartial evaluations of the electoral process, they have instead become highly politicized 
with the governing EPRDF rallying behind the Carter Report and opposition parties 
pleading internationally for the endorsement of the EUs recommendations. Both the 
Carter Centers and the EUs final statements have become tools used by the opposing 
parties to make claims about the legitimacy of the election. In their quest for political 
authority, democratization and international support, Ethiopians have looked to the 
reports as major sources of contention. In disbelief, Ethiopians and members of the 
international community have been left to wonder about the validity of each 
organizations reports. In light of the current political and social situation it is safe to 
insinuate that the Carter Centers report may not have adequately reflected the Ethiopian 
situation or addressed all the relevant and important aspects of the 2005 elections.  
This Chapter will begin with a discussion of the current political situation in 
Ethiopia. Since the self-declared electoral victory by the EPRDF, the Meles Zenawi 
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governments democratic legitimacy has been called into question. In the post election 
period the EPRDF ruled with an iron fist. Government-sponsored human rights abuses 
such as imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and prosecution of opposition members and 
supporters became commonplace. The media has increasingly become censored and 
those that speak out publicly against the atrocities of the Zenawi regime are prosecuted 
and charged with treason. These crimes have not gone unnoticed as international concern 
for Ethiopia and its political situation has swelled. The EU, remaining steadfast in its 
assessment of the election, continues to advocate for peace and reconciliation within 
Ethiopia and has condemned the government sponsored human rights abuses. The Carter 
Center, however, has not released an official response regarding the post-election 
situation. Opposition supporters, Ethiopian academics, the Ethiopian diaspora and 
concerned global citizens alike continue to plea for peace and legitimate democratic 
governance within the nation. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
politicization of the EUs and Carter Centers electoral observation reports.  
The Current Situation  
 In the post election period, the EPRDF has engaged in repressive tactics in its 
attempt to establish itself as the legitimate ruling party of Ethiopia. The EPRDF has 
begun to limit the rights and freedoms of Ethiopians as it has begun to threaten the 
nations commitment to democracy. While it is well known that a democracy entails 
holding regular elections at set intervals and that these elections are suppose to reflect the 
will of the people in their choice for government, it is less known that one of the 
fundamental values underling democracy is valuing and respecting the rights of 
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individuals.155  The EPRDFs failure to respect the citizens of Ethiopia and embark on a 
tyrannical path has not gone unnoticed.  
As of May 2006, both the political and human rights situations have not improved 
within Ethiopia. The government continues to detain supporters of opposition parties and 
those that speak out against the EPRDF and the Zenawi government. Local and 
international human rights advocacy groups have begun to pay close attention to the 
crimes committed by the ruling party and its supporters. The Ethiopian Human Rights 
Council has been active in reporting and broadcasting cases of human rights abuses. The 
Human Rights Council has begun to publish the names of individuals who have been 
detained or murdered for political reasons in the post election period.156 Internationally, 
Human Rights Watch also has begun to report blatant acts of repression and violence. In 
March of 2006 Human Rights Watch requested that the EPRDF government put an end to 
extrajudicial killings after reports of students being murdered by police officers in the 
Oromo region were broadcasted internationally.157 Amnesty International has also 
become an international advocate encouraging the end to violent and repressive 
government sponsored practices. Amnesty International has focused its attention 
predominantly on Ethiopian prisoners of conscience. On 15 May 2006, Amnesty 
International gave a presentation to the European Parliament calling for the European 
Unions help in addressing the human rights situation. Amnesty International asked the 
European Union to assist in the effort to entice the Ethiopian government to release 
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prisoners of conscience; to encourage the Ethiopian government to make a commitment 
to upholding human rights, including the right to free speech; and to more actively 
investigate and report the human rights situation within the nation.158  
 Sine the 2005 elections, the Government of Ethiopia has engaged in activities 
orchestrated to hinder freedom of speech and expression and the freedom of the press. 
The government has endeavored to block access within Ethiopia to political blogs and 
other websites that speak out against and criticize the government.159 Some opposition 
party web sites have also been electronically blocked and citizens within the nation no 
longer have access to these mediums.160 The International Freedom of Expression 
Exchange (IFEX) has noted and made public the actions of the Ethiopian government in 
terms of its actions toward local and international journalists attempting to cover the post 
election situation. In an article entitled Crackdown on Media amid Electoral 
Controversy the IFEX notes that some journalists working for foreign news agencies 
have had there accreditation revoked and some foreign journalists have been accused by 
the government of producing unbalanced reports.161 IFEX has also published that in 
June of 2005 Associated Press reporters had their cameras confiscated and memory cards 
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removed from their digital cameras.162 Reports of local journalists arrested and detained 
without charges have also been made public by IFEX.163  
The government of Ethiopia has also begun to limit political freedoms. As of 31 
May 2006, Hailu Shawel, leader of the CUD, stands on trail for treason. In Ethiopia this 
charge is punishable with the death penalty. Shawel is accused of causing unrest after the 
polls closed in May of 2005.164 Despite calls from the international and aid communities 
to release political prisoners, the Zenawi government is relentlessly perusing the 
prosecution of those believed to have incited political protests.165  The trial of opposition 
leader Shawel points to the repressive nature of the Zenawi government and its 
determination to maintain political control. 
The Network of Ethiopian Scholars has declared the month of May to be 
Ethiopias Special Democracy Month.166 Members of the organization, including 
imprisoned Mayor of Addis Ababa, Dr. Berhanu Nega, call for the true realization of 
democracy within the nation as well as a new election that would accurately reflect the 
will of the people.167  
Many independent observers, the Ethiopian people and the opposition believe that 
the election [was] rigged. The only way that trust, public confidence, honesty and 
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integrity of the election process can be restored is by undertaking an early re-
election, in any case much earlier than the next scheduled re-election in 2010.168 
 
The month of May will serve as a symbol of the failure of the EPRDF government to 
recognize the democratic will of the Ethiopian people. Throughout the month, the 
Network of Ethiopian Scholars encouraged Ethiopians world wide to engage in peaceful 
rallies, democratic workshops, and cultural events to encourage solidarity and call for 
democracy. According to the Network of Ethiopian Scholars, the 2005 elections signified 
a betrayal of the Ethiopian peoples confidence. The Network of Ethiopian Scholars is 
one of many groups calling for the end to of the EPRDFs tyrannical reign. 
In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, the reports issued by both the Carter Center 
and the European Union have left a legacy within Ethiopia. The Carter Center 
acknowledged a great deal of electoral discrepancies and fraud. However, the 
organization commended Ethiopia on its efforts. On the other hand, the European Union 
staunchly argued that the elections did not meet international standards and were marred 
with too many discrepancies to accurately reflect the will of the people. The result of 
these two differing reports has not only led to political and social unrest within Ethiopia it 
has also led to the questioning of the legitimacy and merit of international election 
monitoring.   
International Pledges of Support 
 In reaction to the post-election political and social situation in Ethiopia, members 
of the international community have requested that the EPRDF stop the repressive and 
undemocratic techniques that have become common place within the nation. In the 
                                                
168 Network of Ethiopian Scholars, May 2006Ethiopias Special Democracy Month Press Release No. 
29, 30 April 2006. Retrieved on line at http://sudan tribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=15364 on 8 
June 2006.   
 74
months following the election, the American State Department requested that opposition 
members take up their seats within the House of Peoples Representatives and put an end 
to the violence. Sean McCormack, spokesmen for the State Department commented: we 
deplore the use of violence and deliberate attempts to invoke violence in a misguided 
attempt to resolve political differences.169 He requested that the government of Ethiopia 
release political detainees, including opposition supporters, and said senior leaders 
arrestedshould be treated humanely.170 Almost a year later, American Congressman 
Chris Smith noted that the governments human rights record has remained poor and has 
worsened in some areas.171 These areas include alleged political killings, beatings and 
abuses, poor conditions for prisoners, detention without charge, infringement of privacy 
rights and government restrictions on freedom of assembly.172 
 The international aid donor community has also reacted to the Ethiopia dilemma. 
The African Development Bank and the World Bank both publicly announced that they 
were collectively reviewing development modalities to Ethiopia.173 This decision came 
after protests broke out in the streets of Addis Abba that left 48 dead. 
 The Ethiopia Diaspora has been a guiding light publicizing the political turmoil 
and social unrest within Ethiopia. Rallies were held all over the world. In Washington DC 
several thousand Ethiopian immigrants rallied in front of the State Department on 26 
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May 2005.174 Protesters were encouraging the President to get involved. One protestor 
commented We want Americans to know that Meles is a fascist, hes killing people, 
women, [and] democratic leaders in prison.175 Temesgen Tesfaye claimed in reference 
to the Zenawi government that the US President is supporting terrorists in Ethiopia right 
now.176 
Despite the allegations of biased electoral observation and unfounded 
conclusions, the European Unions opinion on the 2005 election has not faltered. On 15 
May 2006, the anniversary of the 2005 elections, Ana Gomes issued a message of 
solidarity, sympathy and encouragement to the people of Ethiopia. She apologized for the 
crimes and human rights abuses committed by the Zenawi government and assured the 
people of Ethiopia that she along with the European Parliament would continue to fight 
for democracy within the nation. She stated that the people of Ethiopias voices were 
loud and clear, they wanted change.177 Ana Gomes along with the other members of the 
European Union election observation team are no longer welcome in Ethiopia.178 
The Carter Center however, has not made any commitment to address the political 
fallout. While the Carter Center has encouraged the Zenawi regime to reconsider its 
actions against those who have been imprisoned as the result of political protests, the 
Center has not made a commitment to provide support or assistance to rectify the 
situation. The Carter Centers democracy development mandate in Ethiopia ended with 
the release of the 2005 May elections. 
                                                
174 Thousands at Washington Rally Against Ethiopias PM, Sudan Tribune, 15 November 2005. 
Retrieved on line at http://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=12585 on 28 November 2005.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ana Gomes, Message of Solidarity, Speech. London, 15  May 2006. Retrieved online at 
ethiomedia.com on 30 May 2006.   
178 Ibid.   
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The Politicization of the Electoral Observation Reports 
More than a year later, the Carter Centers report continues to be a source of 
contention. While the Zenawi government looks to the document as a source of 
legitimacy, members of opposition groups, academics and concerned citizens publicly 
criticize the Carter Center for coming to illogical conclusions, making recommendations 
that contradict its findings and acting in a manner that goes well beyond the Centers 
mandate.179   
Since the release of the Carter Center final report on the May 2005 elections, the 
Carter Center has encouraged the opposition parties to take up their seats in the House of 
Peoples Representatives and work within the majority EPRDF government. The Center 
acknowledged the claims made by the opposition parties that they had actually won a 
majority during the 2005 elections but has responded by stating that according to their 
evaluation, the EPRDF did indeed win the election.180 During the 2005-2006 
Conversations series at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Jimmy Carter stated that the Center 
had not taken an official position on the EPRDFs margin of victory.181 Although the 
EPRDF has clung to the Carter Centers report as a source of international legitimacy, the 
Center has not issued a statement on the official electoral results. Also, the Carter Center 
has not taken direct responsibility for its assessment nor has the Center attempted to 
officially defend its rulings on the election. Since the release of its final report, the Carter 
                                                
179 Solomon Terfa, To the Carter Center: The Silence is Deafening!, 10 May 2006. Retrieved on line at 
http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/carter_center_050906.html on 11 May 2006.   
180 Jimmy Carter and Rosaline Carter, Watch Conversations Webcast with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, 
21 September 2005. Webcast. Retrieved on line at http://www.cartercenter.org/doc2205.htm on 21 June 
2006.  
181 Jimmy Carter and Rosaline Carter, Watch Conversations Webcast with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, 
21 September 2005. Webcast. Retrieved on line at http://www.cartercenter.org/doc2205.htm on 21 June 
2006. 
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Center has commented on the electoral fallout but has not addressed allegations that its 
report was unreflective of the actual electoral situation.  
The Carter Centers report has become fuel used by those opposing the EPRDF 
government to garner international support. Solomon Terfa, a professor of political 
studies at Alcorn State University in Mississippi, has attempted to discredit the Carter 
Centers assessment, pointing to the weaknesses and flaws in the Carter Centers report in 
a number of newspaper articles. Terfa has suggested that the Center did not engage in an 
unbiased evaluation of the electoral process but instead acted as an agent of the American 
Government to grant support to an illegitimate regime that served and continues to serve 
as a lynchpin in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa.182 Terfa has 
encouraged the Center to respond to the political and social crisis that has arisen in 
Ethiopia and comment on its electoral report in light of the current situation.  
This is not the first time the Carter Center has received criticisms surrounding its 
electoral observation overseas. In 2004 the American Thinker published an article on the 
Carter Centers involvement in Venezuela in 2004. The author of the article, Mora Leon, 
commented that the Carter Center missed many tell tail signs of electoral manipulation.  
The Carter Center skips over discrepancies in areas showing that the number of vote 
cast exceeded the number of registered voters. And [Carters] statement on the 
auditing process in particular is a beauty: Carter said everything was observed free 
and clear, except for what went on in the central totalization room.183 
 
The reports issued by the Carter Center have a history of facing criticism and becoming 
politicized.  
                                                
182 Solomon Terfa, To the Carter Center: The Silence is deafening!, 10 May 2006. Retrieved on line at 
http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/carter_center_050906.html on 11 May 2006.  
183 Mora Leon, Carter, Observed: An American Thinker Exclusive, The American Thinker 30 September 
2004. Retrieved on line at http://www.americanthinker.com/articles_print.php?article_id=3887 on 15 
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 78
 Election monitoring is intended to promote and further cultivate democratic ideals 
and tendencies within a nation struggling with democracy. Monitors are dispatched to 
provide an unbiased assessment of the electoral process and report their findings 
impartially. Their findings should also work to ensure peaceful political processes by 
verifying or condemning the official electoral results. The monitor should provide a third 
party analysis that should be used to address concerns surrounding the electoral process 
and the actual electoral results. The differing reports issued by the Carter Center and the 
EU have skewed this process and have contributed to the unstable political situation that 
currently faces Ethiopia. The two organizations produced reports that would be pit 
against each other amid the post election frustrations and protests.  
Conclusion 
The reports issued by the Carter Center and the EU have had the unexpected 
result of bringing the validity of international election observation into question. As 
Ethiopians and concerned global citizens alike reflect on the Ethiopian situation, it is 
clear that the difference between the reports of both the Carter Centre and European 
Union will leave a lasting legacy on electoral observation missions. The EPRDF has 
rallied behind the Carter Center while condemning the European Union mission and 
declaring it to have produced an inaccurate depiction of the electoral environment. 
Opposition parties have clung to the EU report as they call upon the international 
community to assist them in their fight for their fair share of seats in the House of 
Peoples Representatives and for democracy. The Ethiopian case illustrates how electoral 
reports intended to facilitate democratic development can be spun into levers maneuvered 
by political elite to give validity to their causes.  
 79
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80
Election observation has become a very common democracy development 
initiative. The international democracy development community has come to view 
monitoring as a significant test in terms of evaluating a nations democratic development.    
Throughout the world, monitors have been dispatched to evaluate and scrutinize elections 
thought to be threatened by the possibility of manipulation or rigging. Monitors have also 
been sent to nations where the elections are thought to be crucial in terms of the nations 
democratic development and internal peace.  
Election monitoring is a process that has grown out of good governance 
ideologies and values. It is thought that a free and fair election allows a nation to build a 
government that represents and embodies popular will. Election monitoring facilitates 
this process by evaluating whether or not the election has met the free and fair standards 
as established. The problem however, is that the free and fair standard is vague and 
malleable. Some monitoring groups choose to evaluate elections in terms of clearly 
delineated and outlined international guidelines, while other organizations prefer to look 
to the nations own electoral codes, and assess the election in terms of the nations 
democratic history. In simple terms, this was the case in Ethiopia during the 2005 
elections. The EU and the Carter Center both had different conceptions of free and fair 
electoral practices. The Carter Center chose to evaluate the elections according to 
Ethiopias past electoral standards. The EU on the other hand evaluated the election 
according to international standards.  
The differences between the Carter Center and EU while observing the 2005 
Ethiopia elections were far more complex than utilizing differing free and fair standards. 
The EU embarked on an electoral observation mission that was to be through and assess 
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as many aspects of the election as possible. The EU looked at the media and its 
representation of the ruling and opposition parties. It also took into consideration the 
human rights situation and the legislation surrounding the elections. Of course, the EU 
was present at many of the polling stations, and assessed the vote count, aggregation and 
appeals processes. The Carter Center focused its attention on the media and polling 
station activity. The Carter Center had fewer monitors than the EU, and the Carter Center 
concentrated the majority of its presence in urban centers. These differences help account 
for the differing electoral observation conclusions. Both groups set out with the best 
intentions, not knowing of the political chaos that would ensue in the post-election 
period. The continued politicization of the reports more than a year after the elections has 
painted a poor picture of election monitoring. Also, the inconsistencies in the 
recommendations and conclusions between the Carter Center report and the EU report 
has blemished the reputation of international election monitoring.  
International election monitoring is an important tool in the democracy 
development field. It will continue to serve an essential role in legitimizing political 
regimes and electoral results. However, changes need to be made to the process. Ad hoc, 
go it alone strategies, seem to be more harmful than beneficial to democracy 
development. Co-ordinated efforts are key to the success of electoral monitoring. In the 
case of Ethiopia, if the Carter Center and EU pooled their resources and shared their 
mandate and goals, the potential for the post election fallout would have been greatly 
reduced. The Carter Centre legitimized the EPRDF while the EU questioned the electoral 
process and the ruling party. If the two organizations worked side by side, it would have 
been possible to have conducted an election observation mission that had a farther reach 
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in terms of the number of polling stations it could have visited. Also, if the two 
organizations worked together, more resources could have been given to specific tasks 
such as monitoring the media and human rights situations. The reports would have been 
more thorough and complete with a coordinated effort.  
The Ethiopia case also points to the necessity of a clear understanding and 
definition of electoral standards. As discussed in chapter two, free and fair has limited 
use. It is vague and often used as a sound bite to signify electoral validity. Guidelines 
must be set and determined before electoral monitoring begins in a nation. Again, 
international coordination is needed to facilitate this process.  It should be noted that this 
does happen and is often the practice when large organizations, such as the UN, become 
involved in observation. The UN acts as a coordinator. This process needs to be in place 
at all elections being observed. The establishment of an independent international 
election monitoring guild or organization would be useful. This organization would serve 
as an official certifier of monitors and help put together detailed election observing 
mandates for particular nations. Without such an organization or body, election 
monitoring will continue to be hit and miss.  
  In order to promote quality democracy development within a nation, the capacity 
of the nation must be built. In nations struggling on the path of democratization, 
independent domestic observation should be promoted and encouraged. It has been noted 
that election monitoring has become, for some organizations, a form of political tourism. 
Nations and organizations will send small groups of individuals to a nation to monitor an 
election without the necessary resources or skills to conduct quality monitoring. As 
mentioned in chapter three, some monitors do not have the language skills, are unfamiliar 
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with the political histories of the nation or are unaware of practices that impair the 
legitimacy of an election. These individuals are unequipped to evaluate an election. It 
would be prudent to train and support local peoples to scrutinize the electoral process. 
Nationals know the language and should be familiar with the current political situation. 
With the appropriate training, they would be able to identify questionable practices, while 
at the same time increasing the self-sufficiency of the nation. The goal of democracy 
development is to share with and instil democratic tenets into a nation. With an informed 
and active citizenry this becomes a reality.  
Democracy development can be a very time consuming process. Democracy 
development initiatives should not expect quick results. Often, it takes years and even 
decades to transition. Democracy development promoters recognize this. It is important 
to make a long term commitment in order to see positive change. Organizations that 
engage in numerous development initiatives, whether they be social and human 
development or actual democracy promotion, should recognize the long term 
commitment that often is required. In the case of the Carter Center, the organization is 
involved in many development initiatives. The organization engages in health and human 
development projects as well as in democracy development. In the case of Ethiopia, the 
Carter Center has made only a small commitment to the democratic development of the 
nation and has focused significant attention on human development such as building 
schools and providing supplies, eradicating Guinea Worm Disease and Trachoma, and 
increasing food production. These are all very important initiatives. The problem 
however, is that the organization is multi mandated and limited in terms of its 
commitment to all areas in which it has chosen to participate.  In the post election period, 
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the Carter Center did not offer further support when chaos and political protests broke 
out. The Centers commitment was limited. Democracy promotion is not an overnight 
process. Groups wishing to participate should be in for the long haul if they are truly 
committed to change.  
One may also wonder whether the Carter Center was inclined to verify the 
EPRDF victory to protect its development interests within the nation. The Carter Center 
has a long history within Ethiopia. In 1988 the Jimmy Carter presided over the peace 
negotiations between the Mengistu Haile Mariam government and the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front. In the early 1990s the Carter Center played an integral role in the 
establishment of the nations human rights protection mechanisms.184 In the early 1992 
and 1993 the Carter Center worked with some of the Ethiopian ministries to prevent 
human rights violations. The Center has had a close and cooperative relation with the 
Zenawi government. To declare the election invalid would likely sever the relationship 
between the Center and the EPRDF. One is left to wonder if the human development 
component was weighted as a higher priority than the Centers democracy development 
initiative.  
Also, one is left to wonder if the Carter Center ruled the election to be valid 
because of the American interests within the nation. In the past the EPRDF has been 
ready and willing to cooperate with the American government on issues regarding 
terrorism as the Ethiopian government has worked along side the Americans to monitor 
and keep a lid on terrorist efforts emanating from neighbouring Somalia.  
                                                
184 Carter Center, Activities by Country: Ethiopia, Intervening for Human Rights. Retrieved on line at 
http://www.cartercenter.org/activities/showdoc.asp?countryID=31&submenuname=activities# on 21 July 
2006.   
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It is interesting to note the policy implications of the Carter Centers and 
European Unions actions and reports. The Ethiopian case brings to light a distinction 
between American and European democracy development initiatives. This case points to 
the determination and fervour of the European Union to act according to its clearly 
established and publicised principles. The Ethiopian example also, points to the Carter 
Centers willingness and determination to maintain peaceful and cordial relations with 
the Ethiopian government and to maintain its interests within the nation. The European 
Union has been willing to act according to its findings even at the cost of cutting relations 
with the EPRDF government. The Carter Centers interpretation of the electoral 
environment and process alludes to the organizations willingness to adopt conclusions 
that suit the organizations and perhaps even the greater American interests. It would be 
interesting to further investigate the difference between American and other international 
organizations, including the European Unions, approach to electoral observation to 
verify whether or not American democracy development promotion agencies do work 
under the auspice of a greater agenda. 
Lastly, one is left to ponder why there was so little international involvement 
during the 2005 Ethiopian Election. In 2004 the Ukraine held a second round of national 
elections that saw an unprecedented number of monitors descend on the nation. It is 
apparent that dictatorial regimes will not be permitted in Europe. One is left to wonder 
why democracy is more important in Europe than in Africa. Ethiopia, a nation known to 
have a history of political instability and social maladies, was left to fend for itself. In 
recent years there has been an increase in the amount of attention African politics have 
received. On a continent with so much potential, the international community should step 
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up to the plate, and assist the social and political development of nations struggling with 
democracy development. 
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Annex 1 
Jorgen Elklits and Palle Svenssons Free and Fair Table   
 Dimension 
Time 
Period 
"Free" "Fair" 
Before 
polling 
day 
Freedom of movement A transparent electoral process 
 Freedom of speech (for 
candidates, the media, voters, and 
others) 
An election act and an electoral system that 
grant no special priv-ileges to any political 
party or social group 
 Freedom of assembly Absence of impediments to inclusion in the 
electoral register 
 Freedom of association Establishment of an independent and 
impartial election commission 
 Freedom from fear in connection 
with the election and the electoral 
campaign 
Impartial treatment of can-didates by the 
police, the army, and the courts of law 
 Absence of impediments to 
standing for election (for both 
political parties and independent 
candidates) 
Equal opportunities for political parties and 
independent candidates to stand for election
 Equal and universal suffrage Impartial voter-education programs 
  An orderly election campaign (observance 
of a code of conduct) 
  Equal access to publicly controlled media 
  Impartial allotment of public funds to 
political parties (if relevant) 
  No misuse of government facilities for 
campaign purposes 
   
On 
polling 
day 
Opportunity to participate in the 
election 
Access to all polling stations for 
representatives of the political parties, 
accredited local and international election 
observers, and the media 
  Secrecy of the ballot 
  Absence of intimidation of voters 
  Effective design of ballot papers 
 96
  Proper ballot boxes 
  Impartial assistance to voters (if necessary) 
  Proper counting procedures 
  Proper treatment of void ballot papers 
  Proper precautionary measures when 
transporting election materials 
  Impartial protection of polling stations 
   
After 
polling 
day 
Legal possibilities of complaint Official and expeditious announcement of 
election results 
  Impartial treatment of any election 
complaints 
  Impartial reports on the election results by 
the media 
  Acceptance of the election results by 
everyone involved 
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Annex 2  
1995, 2000 and 2005 Ethiopian House of Peoples Representative Election Results 
 
1995 House of Peoples Representative Election  
Held on 7 May, 18 and 28 June 
 
Registered Voters        21, 337, 379 
Voter Turnout         20, 068, 508  (94.1%) 
 
Party/Coalition        Number of seats (548) 
 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)  483 
Independents         08  
 
Others          46 
Unconfirmed         11 
 
(Opposition groups boycotted the election) 
 
 
 
 
2000 House of Peoples Representatives Election 
Held on 14 May and  31 August 
  
Registered Voters        21, 834, 806 
Voter Turnout        19, 607, 841 (89.8%) 
 
Party/Coalition        Number of Seats (547) 
 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)  481  
 Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO)    183 
 Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)    146 
 Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM)  112 
 Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)     40 
 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic FrontAffiliated Parties   37 
 
Others          16 
Independents         13 
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2005 House of Peoples Representatives Election   
15 May and 21 August 
 
Registered Voters         25, 605, 851 
Voter Turnout         Approximately 82% 
 
Party/Coalition               Number of Seats and % 
 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)  327 (62%) 
 Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)     38 
Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO)    110 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)    87 
Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM)  92 
 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)     109  
Ethiopia Democratic League       2 
All Ethiopian Unity Party        43 
United Ethiopian Democratic Party-Medhin Party    36 
Rainbow Ethiopia: Movement for Democracy and Social Change  8 
 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)     52 
  
Somali Peoples Democratic Unity Organization (SPDP)   24 
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM)    11 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF)  08 
Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)     08 
Gambela Peoples Democratic Movement (GPDM)    03 
Sheko and Mezenger Peoples Democratic Unity Organization (SMPDUO)  01 
Harari National League (HNL)       01 
Argoba National Democratic Organization (ANDO)    01 
Independent         01 
 
As of February 20th the number of the Members of the House was 526. The remaining 20 seats 
were not taken up.   
 
 
 
